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An irony of the information age is that the companies responsible for 
the most extensive surveillance of individuals in history—large platforms such 
as Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have themselves remained unusually 
shielded from being monitored by government regulators. But the legal 
literature on state information acquisition is dominated by the privacy problems 
of excess collection from individuals, not businesses. There has been little 
sustained attention to the problem of insufficient information collection from 
businesses. This Article articulates the administrative state’s normative 
framework for monitoring businesses and shows how that framework is 
increasingly in tension with privacy concerns. One emerging complication is the 
perception that the state, through agencies such as the  National  Security 
Agency, deploys large technology companies to surveil individuals. As a 
result, any routine regulatory monitoring of platforms—even for the purpose 
of prosecuting those platforms—would implicate an overbearing state peering 
into our personal lives. Moreover, opponents of regulation have weaponized 
privacy arguments to shield other businesses from monitoring, such as banks. 
A sharper understanding of the institutional, legal, and informational 
differences between regulatory monitoring and personal surveillance is needed. 
Juxtaposing these two state tools reveals that the tension between regulation 
and privacy is largely illusory. Regulators today—most notably the Federal 
Trade Commission—have untapped power to monitor emerging risks in big 
technology and other sectors. They should not hesitate to use that power to 
pursue a more informed and collaborative path to achieving their missions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Information is the “lifeblood” of effective governance.1 In the 
wake of major crises throughout history—bank failures that threatened 
the North’s ability to fund the Civil War, oil spills that contaminated 
American coastlines, or muckrakers’ exposés of vermin-infested 
meatpacking facilities—Congress has repeatedly responded by giving 
agencies monitoring authority, which is the power to subject businesses 
to routine on-site inspections or examination of private records.2 
Once deployed, monitoring authority can have a powerful 
impact. For instance, increasing the average number of Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) inspections of factories was found to have 
reduced the pollutants that reach nearby neighborhoods—the type of 
pollution that is believed to significantly increase the incidence of 
dementia and premature death—by 2.7 percent.3 Regulatory 
examinations make banks less likely to engage in risky behavior that 
could collapse the financial system.4 Monitoring also facilitates more 
predictable and collaborative regulation by providing a mechanism for 
regular dialogue between industry and government.5 Few projects are 
 
 
 
1. See Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regula- 
tory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 277 (2004) (“Information is the lifeblood of regulatory 
policy.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 253, 259 
(1986) (“[I]nformation is the lifeblood of a regulatory agency . . . .”); Matthew C. Stephenson, In- 
formation Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1423 (2011) (making “the 
commonplace observation—so obvious that it ought to be uncontroversial—that many public deci- 
sions turn on some form of predictive judgment, such that a decisionmaker’s choice does and should 
depend on the quality and content of the information available to her”). 
2. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 371 (2019) (providing a history of regulatory monitoring). Regulatory crises 
prompt diverse policies beyond monitoring. See POLICY SHOCK: RECALIBRATING RISK AND 
REGULATION AFTER OIL SPILLS, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 5–11 (Edward J. Bal- 
leisen, Lori S. Bennear, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 2017). 
3. Jinghui Lim, The Impact of Monitoring and Enforcement on Air Pollutant Emissions, 49 
J. REG. ECON. 203, 204 (2016). 
4. See, e.g., John Kandrac & Bernd Schlusche, The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Tak- 
ing: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, 
Working Paper No. 79, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938039 
[https://perma.cc/G4AA-X6E9]. 
5. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 397–98 (arguing that regulatory monitoring fits well with 
new governance models because it is less adversarial than enforcement lawsuits). On new govern- 
ance emphasizing collaboration and responsiveness, see, for example, IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4–7 (1992); 
COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY (2006); Kenneth A. Bam- 
berger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Ad- 
ministrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Ad- 
ministrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 
(2004). On applying collaborative governance to technology firms, see, for example, Margot E. Ka- 
minski, When the Default is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the NTIA, 94 DENV. L. REV. 923, 
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more  crucial  for  the  regulatory  state  than  establishing  sufficient 
information flow to enforce laws. 
Despite the importance of consistent regulatory access to 
nonpublic information, regulators often lack visibility into business 
activities.6 Most notably today, federal regulators do not regularly 
monitor the companies that run platforms, defined as sites “where 
interactions are materially and algorithmically intermediated.”7 Recent 
events have provoked bipartisan anxiety about the manipulation of U.S. 
presidential elections through Twitter and Facebook;8 exposure of user 
data at companies such as Uber and Yahoo;9 and the anticompetitive 
implications of Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft for small 
businesses and consumers.10 Yet these companies go to extremes to 
keep their inner workings secret.11 
A growing chorus of scholars have proposed regulatory 
monitoring of private algorithms and online platforms.12 Because those 
 
 
 
939 (2017); William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 983 
(2016); and David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 373 (2014). 
6. See infra Part I.A (reviewing which regulators monitor). 
7. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 136 (2017) 
(including as platforms “online marketplaces, desktop and mobile computing environments, social 
networks, virtual labor exchanges, payment systems, [and] trading systems”). 
8. See Matt Apuzzo & Sharon LaFraniere, Indictment Bares Russian Network to Twist 2016 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2018, at A1. 
9. See, e.g., Mike Isaac et al., Uber Breach, Kept Secret for a Year, Hit 57 Million Accounts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2017, at B1; Ryan Knutson & Robert McMillan, Yahoo Hack Swells to 3 Bil- 
lion Accounts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2017, at A1. 
10. Cf. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Com- 
parison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17- 
1784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/YE5Q-6RCN] [hereinafter Commission Fines Google]. 
11. See infra Section II.B. 
12. See, e.g., Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and 
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1662–86 (2017) (drawing on Rory Van Loo’s Helping Buyers Be- 
ware to discuss the need for agencies to “detect” wrongdoing in the sharing economy); Danielle 
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2014) (proposing that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) audit con- 
sumer scoring systems); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 372–73 (2016) (“[P]olicymakers must devise ways of enabling reg- 
ulators to evaluate algorithmically-embedded controls . . . .”); Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, 
Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–17 (2017) (dis- 
cussing how to make algorithms able to be audited by regulators); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Inno- 
vation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. 105, 169–71 (2010) (calling for monitoring of search engines and considering the possi- 
bility of the FTC playing that role); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 
MICH. L. REV. 421, 464 (2017) (calling for greater scrutiny of medical algorithms by the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) and third parties); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government 
Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 
1321, (1992) (calling for “independent governmental monitoring of data processing systems”); Rory 
Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 
1382 (2015) (proposing that the FTC monitor Amazon); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey, 
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proposals are typically made in passing as part of broader discussions 
about technology governance, they address neither the regulatory 
state’s legal foundation nor its normative framework for compelling 
private parties to hand over nonpublic information. Administrative law 
scholarship, which would be a plausible source for such a framework, 
has produced relevant insights into regulators’ tools and motivations 
for information collection.13 But the legal and normative questions 
surrounding state compulsion of private parties to  hand over 
information, even for administrative searches of businesses, have been 
dominated instead by a vast scholarship on privacy and criminal 
surveillance.14 The animating problem in that scholarship, and in the 
privacy literature more broadly, is how to restrict excess information 
collection.15 
 
 
 
“Equality and Privacy by Design”: A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency via 
Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 429 (2019) (propos- 
ing “an auditing regime and a certification program, run either by a governmental body or, in the 
absence of such entity, by private institutions”); see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data 
and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 
121–24 (2014) (considering auditing by public agencies to address predictive privacy harms). 
13. Administrative law scholars’ insights into agencies’ techniques, organizational design, 
and incentives for collecting adequate information provide valuable foundations, but do not ad- 
dress the focus of this Article: the legal framework and normative considerations justifying moni- 
toring authority to compel businesses to provide nonpublic information to regulators. See, e.g., 
Coglianese et al., supra note 1, at 324–25 (focusing on regulatory incentives to pursue voluntary 
information collection for policymaking); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure 
and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 650–54 (2012) (suggesting institutional improve- 
ments for regulatory inspectors); Stephenson, supra note 1, at 1483 (identifying legal-institutional 
design choices for incentivizing information gathering). 
14. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 246 (2017) 
(identifying surveillance concerns and the misuse of administrative subpoenas); Orin S. Kerr, 
Searches and Seizures in A Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 533 (2005) (“This Article devel- 
ops a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer hard 
drives and other electronic storage devices.”); Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative 
Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 261–62 (2011) (examining inspections of businesses and other 
administrative searches and situating “the dilution of Fourth Amendment rights in the adminis- 
trative search context within the larger story of diminishing criminal procedure rights . . . .”); 
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 92–95 (2016) (drawing on 
the Supreme Court’s regulatory inspection decisions to illuminate the Fourth Amendment and 
policing); see also infra Section IV.C (situating monitoring within the literature on surveillance 
and privacy). 
15. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 
105 CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2017) (analyzing how the law can delineate boundaries for worker surveil- 
lance); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative 
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008) (assessing the efficacy of agency privacy impact assess- 
ments); G.S. Hans, Curing Administrative Search Decay, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 2–3 (2018) 
(“This Article focuses on the role of regulatory agencies in the collection of user data from private 
businesses. It argues that the government should not be able to so easily collect sensitive infor- 
mation without a warrant, active oversight, or robust limitations.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two 
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153, (2004) (“It is a 
commonplace, moreover, that our privacy is peculiarly menaced by the evolution of modern society, 
with its burgeoning technologies of surveillance and inquiry.”); Andrew McCanse Wright, Civil 
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This Article builds on that literature to examine the opposite 
problem: insufficient information collection. It offers a framework for 
why lawmakers have pervasively granted collection authority to 
agencies and develops that framework through a case study of online 
platforms. To comprehend the inattention and resistance to monitoring 
platforms,16 and more broadly, how the norms for monitoring 
businesses are evolving in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to 
broaden the doctrinal and administrative lens to include agencies that 
at first seem unrelated to regulatory monitoring: the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”), National Security Agency (“NSA”), U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and other federal and 
local agencies that are primarily concerned with crime and national 
security. For ease of exposition, these agencies are referred to below as 
“crime agencies” to contrast them with “regulators,” which focus on 
enforcing civil laws against businesses, although important distinctions 
exist within each category and both types of agencies can play a role in 
enforcing diverse laws.17 
The literature on crime surveillance has remained mostly 
disconnected from that on regulatory monitoring.18 Crime agencies 
often engage in surveillance, defined in the surveillance studies 
literature as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal 
details.”19 Most prominently, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
intelligence agencies built databases that enabled them to conduct 
warrantless computer scans of the metadata from most U.S. citizens’ 
email, phone, and internet records.20 Regulators, unlike crime agencies, 
 
 
 
Society and Cybersurveillance, 70 ARK. L. REV. 745, 745 (2017) (“There is no such thing as benign 
surveillance.”); sources cited supra note 14. 
16. Some observers in favor of regulating tech prefer public disclosures or an ex post, litiga- 
tion-oriented approach. The reasons for the hostility include concerns about the independent spirit 
of the internet, a lack of regulatory sophistication, and the possibility that heavier regulation 
would       stifle       innovation.       See       infra       Section       II.C;        see        also 
Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet Governance, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND INSTITUTIONS 48, 57–58 (2009) (discussing early resistance to internet regulation). 
17. Criminal law and national security law are two distinct bodies that primarily pursue the 
punishment of incarceration. When regulators identify criminal wrongdoing in the course of their 
affairs, they may then refer the matter to other agencies for prosecution. See infra Section III.B. 
Although the terms elide major differences within each category worthy of study, they facilitate 
the exposition and examination of broader themes crucial to understanding monitoring. 
18. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 17–21 (2007) (providing a review of sur- 
veillance studies without mentioning regulatory monitoring). But see Robert A. Mikos, Can the 
States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2012); Slobogin, supra 
note 14. 
19. LYON, supra note 18, at 14. 
20. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 14, at 107 (“[T]he federal government at one time routinely 
swept up virtually everyone’s ‘metadata’—the identifying information about our communica- 
tions—and may well have collected (and continued to collect) much more than that.”). 
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do not have a history of personal surveillance provoking public outcry. 
Yet scholars and judges routinely use “surveillance” to refer to 
regulatory monitoring of businesses.21 In addition, the same clause of 
the Fourth Amendment and section of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”) govern each type of information collection.22 Above all, 
privacy concerns have shaped both underlying legal frameworks since 
colonial times.23 Regulatory monitoring and crime surveillance thus 
share close conceptual and legal ties. 
The conflation of these two distinct administrative activities is 
problematic in underappreciated ways. The pervasiveness of 
technological surveillance “has helped spark an anti-surveillance, 
proprivacy movement that extends across legal scholarship, policy 
debates, civil rights advocacy, political discourse, and public 
consciousness.”24 The salience of this controversy complicates the 
regulatory monitoring of platforms because crime agencies use 
technology firms as “the real data-mining masterminds” of their 
surveillance.25 When one of the most pressing concerns among the 
populace and leading jurists is the state accessing information about 
individuals through technology companies, regulatory monitoring of 
those companies is easily confused with inviting the state to invade our 
privacy.26 Accordingly, accusations of endangering personal privacy 
have put regulators on the defensive, even at one point shutting down 
vital Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) regulatory 
information collection.27  At the extreme, privacy may even follow a 
 
 
 
21. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007) (referring to regulation 
of national banks as “audits and surveillance”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 
229, 252 (1986) (discussing the EPA’s warrantless “surveillance” of businesses); Woodrow Hartzog 
& Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2015) 
(noting that “the language and framing used in surveillance debate is diverse, inconsistent, and 
over-generalized”); Price, supra note 12, at 462–65 (using surveillance and monitoring to describe 
FDA oversight of medical devices). To facilitate exposition, this Article refers to regulators’ infor- 
mation collection as monitoring and to crime agencies’ as surveillance, but surveillance and mon- 
itoring can be used interchangeably. 
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (regulating searches and seizures); Administrative Procedure 
Act § 6, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (2012) (governing “investigative acts”). 
23. See infra Sections I.C.1. and III.A. 
24. Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 426 (2017). 
25. Nancy S. Kim & D. A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-Governmental Actors 
and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 723 (2015); see also Samuel J. Rascoff, 
Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 662 (2016) (“A critically important . . . feature of 
the new intelligence oversight ecosystem is the role of American technology and telecommunica- 
tions firms.”); David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 42 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2016) (“[T]here is little question that the major data brokers know more 
about each of us than say, for example, the National Security Agency, the Internal Revenue Ser- 
vice, the Social Security Administration, or any other governmental institution.”). 
26. See infra Section IV.C. 
27. See infra Section IV.C. 
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trajectory seen with transparency and free speech: moving from a tool 
deployed by those engaged in state-building to a tool deployed by 
antistatists seeking to obstruct regulation.28 
The conceptual association of regulatory monitoring and crime 
surveillance obscures important institutional and informational 
differences. Regulators target information about businesses, while 
crime agencies target personal information.29 Moreover, throughout 
history public outcry has often driven Congress to force regulators to 
use more of the monitoring authority they already had, while scandals 
have prompted Congress to do the opposite with crime agencies—to 
restrict their surveillance activities.30 Outside of crises, however, 
lawmakers have passed important laws such as the APA without 
distinguishing between agencies—thereby potentially restricting 
business regulators through legislation meant to respond to unease 
about crime agencies.31 By overlooking the significant differences 
between crime agencies and regulators, the legal framework may 
inadvertently hinder regulators that instead need encouragement to 
collect adequate information.32 
This Article’s main contributions are to illuminate the legal 
framework for monitoring businesses and to show how that vital 
enforcement tool is hindered by operating in the shadow of widely 
maligned personal surveillance.33 These insights also have important 
 
 
28. On the link between privacy origins and state-building, see Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping 
Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 
565 (2007) (tracing privacy origins not to the Constitution but to the early Post Office and “those 
who sought independence”); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Lib- 
erties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2014) (arguing that that “[p]rogressive lawyers within 
the executive branch took the lead in forging a new civil-libertarian consensus and that they did 
so to strengthen rather than to circumscribe the administrative state,” and mentioning privacy as 
historically analogous to civil liberties). For arguments that transparency and free speech have 
served deregulatory agendas, see, for example, David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 
128 YALE L.J. 100, 102 (2018) (arguing that transparency serves to “reduce other forms of regula- 
tion”); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (2016) (“Once the mainstay 
of political liberty, the First Amendment has emerged as a powerful deregulatory engine . . . .”). 
29. See infra Section III.B.1. 
30. See infra Section III.B.1. 
31. See infra Section III.B.1. 
32. Scholars have concluded that agency overzealousness varies, and as a result, oversight 
mechanisms designed to check overzealous bureaucrats ignore important agency heterogeneity. 
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (2006) (arguing that “the claim that agencies are systematically biased 
in a proregulatory direction finds little support in public choice theory, the political science litera- 
ture, or elsewhere”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and 
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1354–55 (2013) (“There is no compelling argument that agen- 
cies will be more inclined to overreach than underperform . . . .). 
33. Scholars have discussed a distinct but related tension between the need to protect trade 
secrets and the need to regulate businesses. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: 
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 163–64 (2016). 
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policy implications across the regulatory state, including for the 
primary regulator of platforms, the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”).34 The newly appointed FTC commissioners have expressed an 
interest in greater oversight of platforms.35 Yet the agency does not 
monitor businesses, except in limited contexts currently required by 
law.36 In early 2019, nine months after an early draft of this Article was 
circulated at a conference attended by FTC officials, the agency 
announced a task force to monitor technology companies.37 However, 
the task force is focused on competition—which leaves out consumer 
protection and privacy—and it is unclear how far the group will move 
beyond the FTC’s traditional light-touch, ex post information collection 
approach.38 This Article concludes that the FTC’s authorizing statute, 
when viewed in the context of judicial precedent and the normative 
foundations for monitoring, indicates that the FTC could—without any 
congressional action—monitor businesses far more extensively than it 
traditionally has.39 FTC monitoring of the surveillance economy would 
bring the regulatory governance of the world’s most valuable industry 
more in line with that of other large industries. 
The issues facing regulatory monitoring of platforms portend 
larger tensions building for regulatory monitoring in the surveillance 
era. Other agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”), likely sit on similar untapped authority.40 Companies ranging 
from Citibank to Target to American Airlines increasingly amass 
customers’ personal data and connect with platforms—thereby 
producing    harms    similar    to    those    that    platforms    produce. 
 
 
34. The FTC regulates online platforms for antitrust, privacy, and consumer protection. See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). 
35. Diane Bartz, FTC Nominees Open to Tech Probes, Concerned About High Drug Prices, 
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2018, 1:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ftc-congress/ftc-nomi- 
nees-open-to-tech-probes-concerned-about-high-drug-prices-idUSKCN1FY2RN 
[https://perma.cc/4QHW-XGY3]. 
36. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (requiring pre-merger notification). 
37. See  2018  Privacy  Law  Scholars  Conference,  BERKELEY  L.,  https://www.law.berke- 
ley.edu/research/bclt/bcltevents/2018annual-privacy-law-scholars-conference  (last  visited  Sept. 
22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2FJ3-8WN5] (listing Joseph Calandrino and Kevin Moriarty as attend- 
ing the May 30–31 conference in Washington, D.C.); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC’s 
Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Technology Markets (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task- 
force-monitor-technology [https://perma.cc/6ZKJ-5H26] (“Agency dedicates resources exclusively 
towards monitoring competition in the tech industry and taking enforcement actions when war- 
ranted.”). This Article was also workshopped at the Georgetown Technology Law and Policy Col- 
loquium, and received input from a former FTC high-ranking official, ten months before the an- 
nouncement  of  the  task  force.  Since  the  Article  was  mostly researched,  workshopped, and 
submitted before that task force’s launch, it does not include an examination of that new group. 
38. See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra Section IV.A. 
40. See infra Section IV.B. 
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Congressional leaders have also weighed legislation for auditing 
algorithms in select contexts, such as for discrimination.41 For these and 
related issues, it would be ideal for agency leaders, judges, and 
lawmakers, in deciding whether to monitor, to consider the context of 
the modern regulatory state’s legal and normative framework for that 
authority. 
If the monitoring framework is to be updated for the surveillance 
era, there is a risk in moving where prominent privacy warnings seem 
to naturally direct it—away from monitoring due to unease about 
regulators collecting customer data. Legitimate privacy concerns do not 
demand the complete avoidance of monitoring because they can be 
addressed through the design of monitoring programs and through 
legal constraints.42 In fact, what the surveillance era may call for—at 
least to prevent some types of harms—is more government monitoring 
of businesses.43 Among other reasons, monitoring can help regulators 
determine whether businesses are safeguarding customers’ data.44 
Clarifying the normative and legal framework for regulatory 
monitoring also helps sketch a blueprint for an improved 
administrative information architecture. Instead of restricting crime 
agencies and business regulators in the same way, as the APA and other 
statutes do, legislators should tailor restrictions to the divergent 
informational dynamics of each of those categories of agencies.45 
Greater attention to the fine distinctions between regulators and crime 
agencies, and the purposes of their information collection, would help 
reset the state informational framework to its constitutional roots by 
prioritizing personal privacy over business privacy. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I examines the 
historical record to identify the factors considered in congressional 
 
 
 
41. James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for 
Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 260 (2019) (discussing a congres- 
sional hearing on oversight of algorithms). 
42. See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 15 (identifying mechanisms for increasing agen- 
cies’ privacy accountability); Hans, supra note 15, at 34 (discussing the need for limitations in 
regulatory programs that collect data); infra Section III.B. 
43. This assumes that the government continues to reflect democratic values, or that the 
monitor has appropriate constraints in place should that fail to be the case. Nor does it completely 
preclude private monitoring regimes, although purely private regimes may have limits. See infra 
Part II.C. 
44. See infra Section III.A. Although he did not discuss business monitoring, the competing 
privacy interests between business owners and users is arguably an example of what David Pozen 
has described as a “privacy-privacy tradeoff.” Cf. David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 221, 221 (2016) (“Whenever securing privacy on one margin compromises privacy on 
another margin, a privacy-privacy tradeoff arises.”). By analogy, this Article develops a privacy- 
regulation tradeoff. 
45. See infra Section III.B. 
2019] MONITORING IN THE SURVEILLANCE AGE 1573 
 
 
extension and judicial approval of regulatory monitoring authority. 
Part II begins a case study of platforms by applying the three factors 
weighing in favor of monitoring: a public interest in preventing harm, 
information asymmetries, and self-regulatory shortcomings. Part III 
explains the two main factors historically weighing against monitoring, 
privacy and burden, and considers how they are changing in the 
surveillance era. Part IV concludes by examining legal and theoretical 
implications. It analyzes the scope of the FTC’s dormant statutory 
monitoring authority, and briefly considers possible action by other 
agencies, such as the FCC and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”). Both agency discretion and statutory design 
would benefit from a normative framework that  more clearly 
demarcates the actors, targets, and content of monitoring from those of 
surveillance. The overarching goal is to contribute to an administrative 
structure that ensures regulators in the future, like crime agencies 
today, have the information they need to make informed decisions. 
 
I. RATIONALE FOR REGULATORY MONITORING 
 
Despite strong countervailing interests in privacy and autonomy 
at the founding of the country, regulators have steadily gained the 
authority to peer inside businesses to promote legal compliance. The 
legal literature lacks any holistic analysis of the considerations that 
legislators and judges weighed in elevating regulatory monitoring 
authority to a central role in policing firms. This Part begins to fill that 
gap by surveying the factors historically weighed in extending 
monitoring authority. The rest of the Article then develops this 
framework in the context of the platform economy and the surveillance 
state.46 
 
A. Overview of Regulatory Monitoring 
 
This Article is focused on administrative agencies’ “systematic 
and routine” collection of nonpublic information, rather than one-off 
investigations.47 The state has in recent decades increasingly relied on 
such “programmatic” information for enforcing criminal laws, ranging 
 
 
46. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson conceived of the National Surveillance State as a new 
form of governance responding “to the particular needs of warfare, foreign policy, and domestic 
law enforcement in the twenty-first century.” See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Pro- 
cesses of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 489 (2006). But see Orin S. Kerr, The National Surveillance State: A 
Response to Balkin, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2180 (2009) (arguing that the National Surveillance 
State is more about technological change than a new form of governance). 
47. Slobogin, supra note 14, at 93. 
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from roadside checkpoints to call record databases.48 Routine business 
monitoring also has steadily grown to become one of the regulatory 
state’s core powers.49 
At first glance, the work of front-line bureaucrats who monitor 
may seem mundane: poring over financial records to identify risky bank 
transactions, inspecting poultry for signs of contamination, or assessing 
the pollution controls in factories.50 But like police officers, regulatory 
monitors make life-altering decisions about when and how the law will 
be enforced and against whom.51 They are often scientists, economists, 
and engineers with the power to obligate companies to pay millions to 
their customers in redress, block hazardous food products from reaching 
Americans’ dinner tables, or shut down offshore oil rigs.52 Whereas legal 
scholars universally recognize that law enforcement officers wield 
considerable authority in federal criminal law, the role of their civil law 
counterparts—regulatory monitors—is overlooked.53 
For present purposes, regulatory monitoring is the collection of 
information that the agency can force a  business to provide even 
without suspecting a particular act of wrongdoing. The two main 
categories of monitoring are remote report collection and on-site visits. 
The scope of information accessible to on-site inspectors depends on 
their mandate. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and EPA 
inspectors, for instance, can access records related to their missions— 
food safety and the environment—but cannot examine records about 
profit.54 Bank examiners, in contrast, can access almost any piece of 
data because their mission is broad.55 These visits may occur with 
advanced notice or unannounced, as when oil inspectors drop in via 
 
 
 
48. Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1039, 1042 (2016) (“While our Fourth Amendment framework is transactional, then, surveillance 
is increasingly programmatic.”); see also Slobogin, supra note 14, at 93: 
Panvasive searches and seizures . . . seek to ferret out or deter undetected wrongdo- 
ing . . . rather than focus on a particular crime known to have already  oc- 
curred; . . . they are purposefully suspicionless with respect to any particular individ- 
ual, and thus will almost inevitably affect a significant number of people not involved 
in wrongdoing. 
49. Van Loo, supra note 2, at 373 (describing the regulatory state’s pervasive reliance on 
ongoing monitoring); cf. MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT EXPLOSION (1994) (describing the growth of 
audits by private and public actors in the United Kingdom). 
50. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 372–73. 
51.   Id. at 373. 
52.   Id. at 373–74. 
53. Id. 
54. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012); Federal Food, Drug, and Cos- 
metic Act § 372, 21 U.S.C. § 372 (2012). 
55. See John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before a Conference on 
Credit Rating and Scoring Models (May 17, 2004), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issu- 
ances/speeches/2004/pub-speech-2004-36.pdf      [https://perma.cc/M8UM-A547]. 
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helicopter on Gulf of Mexico oil platforms to check safety and 
environmental compliance.56 For some companies, such as the largest 
banks and nuclear facilities, regulators have resident monitors on site 
year-round. 
Even agencies with on-site inspection authority typically 
supplement those efforts with heavy remote monitoring. These can 
occur through one-off requests to answer specific questions (such as 
asking to clarify a new technology used), whenever a specific event 
occurs (such as a proposed merger), or on a periodic basis (such as 
monthly reports on bank lending activities). Agencies also sometimes 
use legal authority to install remote-monitoring devices, such as 
sensors measuring equipment inside a manufacturing facility.57 Once 
these reports or data sets are in place, analysts within the regulator 
conduct spot-check audits, algorithmically driven systemic reviews, or 
other checks to identify violations. 
Monitors respond to violations in different ways depending on 
the agency. Banking monitors, called “examiners,” typically have the 
independence to decide how to resolve the violation.58 For instance, 
CFPB examiners have required banks to make multimillion dollar 
payments without an enforcement lawyer playing a substantial role.59 
Due to banks’ fears of creating an antagonistic relationship, and the 
examiners’ ability to pass a matter on to enforcement lawyers for formal 
legal proceedings, the examiners have substantial leverage in making 
informal demands.60 The EPA, in contrast, has a more integrated 
approach. Once the EPA inspector—typically an engineer—identifies 
anything more than a minor violation, she works side by side with a 
lawyer to seek redress, even coauthoring court briefs.61 
Of the nineteen large federal regulators of business, only four 
rely more heavily on lawyers than monitors.62 Notably, the two agencies 
that are arguably the most important for overseeing the surveillance 
economy are among these four that do not rely heavily on monitoring: 
the FTC, which is the agency with the most regulatory authority over 
platforms, and the FCC, which oversees other important information 
 
 
56. See Guy Hayes, A Day in the Life of an Inspector, BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENF’T, 
https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/feature-stories/a-day-in-the-life-of-an-inspector (last visited Sept. 
22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/QL2V-5A83]. 
57. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
115, 156 (2004). 
58. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 413–14. 
59.   Id. at 414. 
60.   Id. 
61.   Id. at 434. 
62. See id. at 382–83, 409–10 (finding low monitoring reliance at the FCC, FTC, EEOC, and 
National Labor Relations Board). 
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technology firms, such as telecommunications and cable companies.63 
Even without heavy reliance on monitoring, regulators may still access 
firms’ information for investigations after wrongdoing is suspected, or 
in other limited contexts.64 For instance, the FTC conducts one-off 
studies of a given industry or practice to decide whether it should act.65 
However, unlike most large regulators, the FTC and FCC do not rely 
for their enforcement actions on routinely compelling large firms to 
hand over information without particular suspicion of wrongdoing.66 
Thus, monitoring authority is pervasive, and monitors—despite 
being overlooked in the literature and largely absent in the technology 
sector—are perhaps the single most influential law enforcement group 
in the regulatory state.67 An account of why regulators monitor is 
overdue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63. The CFPB also regulates fintech platforms. Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by De- 
fault: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531 (2018). 
64. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 393–95. 
65. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 103 
(2016) (describing the FTC’s “structural case model”). 
66. As one measure of this, most large regulators devote more resources to monitors than to 
lawyers. See supra Table 1. 
67. See supra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1: SHARE OF MONITORS AND LAWYERS WITHIN REGULATORY 
MONITOR AGENCIES 
 
Monitor Employees as a Percentage of 
Combined Monitor and Lawyer Workforce68 
Light 
Monitors 
<15% 
 
 
15-49% 
 
 
50-85% 
Heavy 
Monitors 
>85% 
FTC 3% FCC 34% FERC 62% FDA 98% 
EEOC 0% EPA 60% NCUA 97% 
NLRB 0% CFPB 54% FSIS 95% 
SEC 53% Fed. Res. 95% 
OSHA 93% 
NRC 93% 
FAA 93% 
FMCSA 93% 
OCC 93% 
MSHA 91% 
FDIC 86% 
 
 
A. Why Do Regulators Monitor? 
 
Courts and lawmakers weigh a number of factors in deciding 
whether monitoring is appropriate. Since privacy and criminal law 
scholarship has dominated the topic of administrative information 
collection, existing descriptive frameworks focus on Fourth Amendment 
constraints on searches.69 Those analyses unearth many of the basic 
elements of a search scheme, which must be judged, according to the 
Supreme Court, “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”70 
However, the analysis for courts of whether the state can 
monitor does not fully answer the question of why the state monitors. 
In practice, the Fourth Amendment provides minimal restrictions on 
regulatory collection of business information.71 When courts invoke the 
 
 
68. Table constructed from data in Van Loo, supra note 2. The acronyms not already men- 
tioned are the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Reserve, 
Food Safety & Inspection Service, Mine Safety & Health Administration, National Credit Union 
Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Council, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
69. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
70.   Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
71. Primus, supra note 14, at 255–56 (describing the broad judicial allowances of 
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Fourth Amendment to strike down monitoring, they find a particular 
implementation unconstitutional, rather than the agency’s underlying 
authority.72 As a result, the regulator can still exercise monitoring 
authority in a different manner, such as by more narrowly tailoring its 
actions or obtaining an administrative warrant. The Fourth 
Amendment also does not concern itself with regulators declining to 
monitor when they could.73 
A caveat is in order. Lawmakers have numerous tools at their 
disposal. As an alternative to monitoring, for instance, lawmakers could 
rely on heavy fines and ex post deterrence.74 These choices reflect a 
fundamental regulatory tradeoff between “police patrols” and “fire 
alarms.”75 Policy designers can devote resources to search routinely for 
problems—as police do when patrolling the streets—or can wait for 
someone to pull a fire alarm to alert the authorities.76 In the case of 
regulating businesses, regulatory monitors are analogous to police 
patrols, and fire alarms to employee whistleblowers. At least in some 
contexts, there is evidence that an increase in regulatory monitoring is 
more effective than an increase in sanctions.77 Nonetheless, a 
comparison of whether monitoring deters better than its many 
regulatory alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article and has yet 
to be answered satisfactorily despite decades of study.78 
More attainable, and still relevant to studying deterrence, is an 
understanding of the basic factors that lawmakers weigh in deciding to 
 
 
 
 
administrative searches under the Fourth Amendment). 
72. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447–48 (2015) (striking down a require- 
ment that hotels store guest records for 90 days); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 
(1978) (stating that a warrant could be obtained pursuant to a general administrative plan). 
73. On nonmonitoring despite authority to do so, see, for example, infra Section IV.A. 
74. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Em- 
pirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 209–214 (2019) (discussing fac- 
tors influencing compliance with agency guidance). Moreover, even in deciding on an ex post re- 
gime, lawmakers could choose to depend on administrative agencies or private parties to bring 
lawsuits, or both. 
75. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–66 (1984). 
76.   Id. at 166. 
77. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms 
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 119 (2003) (concluding in the 
context of environmental law that “increases in monitoring lead to increases in compliance and 
performance, but increases in sanctions have limited effect”). 
78. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 176, 179 (1968) (emphasizing the likelihood of detection and the harshness of punish- 
ment in corporate compliance); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. 
ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (developing a model on sanctions and the probability of being caught). Part 
of this has to do with broader challenges in quantifying the effects of regulation. See, e.g., Richard 
L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1425–26 (2014). 
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extend monitoring authority.79 Three primary indicators of the need for 
regulatory monitoring are a public interest in preventing harm, 
information asymmetries, and a lack of faith in self-regulation. The rest 
of this Part will explore these three factors and then turn to the 
countervailing considerations of privacy and burden. 
 
1. Public Interest in Prevention 
 
Courts have begun their analysis of whether to uphold 
monitoring legislation by considering the extent of the public interest.80 
For instance, in various cases they have emphasized the need to 
promote “public health and safety”81 or protect the environment.82 Like 
the underlying legislation granting monitoring authority, these cases 
regularly proceed without defining public interest or establishing how 
one would know whether a public interest exists. Given the breadth of 
situations in which courts have upheld monitoring authority, and the 
absence of a prominent example of courts blocking monitoring for 
failing the public interest requirement, the judicial standard for finding 
a public interest is low.83 
The public interest provides a more meaningful filter in moni- 
toring legislation. Two components are particularly important: the mo- 
bilization of public opinion and the inadequacy of ex post compensation. 
In practice, to mobilize public opinion, it has often taken a grave crisis 
or media outcry. Abraham Lincoln pushed for the first of today’s large 
monitoring regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), because of a crisis during the Civil War. Bank collapses from 
imprudent management outraged depositors who lost their savings and 
made it harder for the federal government to pay for military supplies 
and soldiers’ wages.84 In response, Congress passed the National Bank 
 
 
79. Identifying factors weighed contributes to the question of deterrence by, for instance, 
highlighting variables to be tested empirically. Stated otherwise, to improve a framework, it helps 
to understand what it is. 
80. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967) (observing that “it is 
obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official 
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen”). 
81. See, e.g., id. at 535 (concluding that in this case “[t]he primary governmental interest at 
stake is to prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public 
health and safety”). 
82. See, e.g., S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 804 F. Supp. 2d 
1045, 1061 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
83. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981) (explaining the federal interest in 
mine inspections partly through harms to interstate commerce); Camara, 387 U.S. at 535 (men- 
tioning economic harms to property as justifying inspections). 
84. See Eugene N. White, Lessons from the History of Bank Examination and Supervision in 
the United States, 1863-2008, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF FINANCIAL 
CRISES: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, 15, 18 (Alfredo Gigliobianco & Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009). 
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Act of 1864, which established the OCC, authorized the on-site exami- 
nation of bank affairs, and required monthly reports of their accounts 
to the agency.85 At other times, muckrakers or advocates have raised 
awareness. For instance, Congress passed the Meat Inspection Act of 
1906 after Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle alarmed the public with graphic 
descriptions of filthy food production.86 
The second element of a public interest in monitoring is the be- 
lief that waiting to act until after the harm has materialized would be 
insufficient because of an “irreparable harm.”87 Regulatory monitoring 
becomes more appealing if courts’ ex post compensation is seen as inad- 
equate once families have lost their homes due to risky bank behavior 
or beaches have become polluted by an oil spill. 
 
2. Information Asymmetries 
 
The less regulators know about a firm’s activities, the more 
important it is to compel information production to determine whether 
intervention is needed. Courts have repeatedly cited the ease with 
which businesses can conceal violations and falsify information as a 
rationale for regulatory monitoring.88 However, judges look unfavorably 
on monitoring when alternative sources of information are available.89 
In other words, monitoring is seen as a last resort, only to be used when 
alternative means of information collection, such as consumer 
complaints, are insufficient.90 
 
 
 
85. National Banking Act of 1864, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); see also Bank 
Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004). 
86. Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 601–695 (2012)); Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing Regula- 
tion After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2413 (2001). 
87. S. Yuba River Citizens League, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (“The court finds that inspec- 
tions . . . required by the current sediment management plan are necessary to prevent irreparable 
harm . . . .”). 
88. See, e.g., Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 880 F.3d 274, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2018) (summa- 
rizing the line of cases discussing the necessity requirement as based on the ease of falsification of 
the relevant information or ease of concealing violations). 
89. See, e.g., Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per 
curiam) (assessing the validity of the FTC’s information collection by noting that “the information 
sought was not available to the FTC from another federal source”); see also New York v. Burger, 
482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987) (finding that alternatives to warrantless inspections of business prem- 
ises might not work as well). 
90. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (weighing whether “any other 
canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results”). The EPA, for instance, complements its 
factory inspections with remote devices measuring general pollution output in a given geography. 
Air Data Basic Information, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/outdoor-air-quality-data/air-data-basic-in- 
formation (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/A7JD-8JCZ] (noting that EPA data is col- 
lected both through “monitoring stations owned and operated mainly by state environmental agen- 
cies” and through emissions readings taken through factory inspections). 
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The congressional record surrounding the creation of the OCC 
shows a similar emphasis on information asymmetries. Lawmakers 
believed that “very full and very stringent” examination authority was 
necessary so that a bank could not “be conducted fraudulently or 
dishonestly without exposure.”91 Lawmakers consequently mandated a 
system based on government bureaucrats, called examiners, appearing 
unannounced at banks across the nation.92 
The relevant information asymmetry is not only that between 
the business and the regulator, but also between the business and the 
public. In passing the Meat Inspection Act, lawmakers emphasized the 
public health interests in preventing sellers from causing “injury to the 
uninformed” and concern about what the slaughterhouses and 
meatpackers would do behind closed doors.93 Nobel Prize–winning 
economics research has provided further theoretical and empirical 
support for concluding that information asymmetries are pervasive 
between businesses and that they create problems for regulators.94 
 
3. Self-Regulatory Shortcomings 
 
Sinclair’s muckraking illustrates another factor pushing 
policymakers toward monitoring: the perception of inadequate self- 
regulation. The starting point in any industry has typically been that 
“the enlightened self-interest of an entrepreneur sufficed to guarantee 
the public safety.”95 In other words, once business managers are aware 
of the consequences—whether reputational or otherwise—of any bad 
acts, they can be trusted to take appropriate precautions. Events have 
repeatedly caused lawmakers to question that assumption. 
For instance, bank managers regularly acted carelessly in using 
depositors’ funds prior to the Civil War, despite laws punishing banker 
misconduct, and despite the risk of ruined reputations in the 
community.96 More recently, food company managers knew that selling 
tainted products could harm their brands and yet numerous people died 
from  salmonella  in  peanut  butter,  ice  cream,  and  other  packaged 
 
 
 
 
91. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 824 (1863). 
92. White, supra note 84, at 21. 
93. 40 CONG. REC. 1133 (1906) (statement of Mr. Heyburn). 
94. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); Jean Tirole, Market Failures and Public Policy, NOBEL 
PRIZE 513–15 (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/tirole-lecture.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3YFU-EZVT]. 
95. John G. Burke, Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power, 7 TECH. & CULTURE 2 (1966). 
96. See White, supra note 84, at 20. 
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foods.97 And oil company executives were aware that environmental 
disasters could devastate their business prior to the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill, which cost BP tens of billions of dollars.98 
Of course, as a practical matter, it is unrealistic to expect perfect 
compliance. And it is a matter of debate whether a crisis prompts 
Congress to act in ways it should have all along, or to overreact in the 
wake of disaster.99 Nor is it necessarily clear the extent to which the 
self-regulatory fault lies solely with the business or with the larger legal 
environment. But empirical studies have found that regulatory 
monitoring improves self-regulation, at least in some industries.100 One 
of the theoretical reasons why monitoring may be necessary beyond 
strong ex post deterrence is that people operate in a boundedly rational 
manner that makes them underestimate the likelihood of a bad event 
happening to them (and to the business they run), such as an oil spill 
or a bank failure.101 Regardless of the empirical results, throughout 
history, policymakers have regularly concluded that firms neglected to 
adopt appropriate risk management practices even when the law 
already imposed ex post punishment.102 
 
C. Traditional Limits on Monitoring: Privacy and Burden 
 
This Section provides an overview of the two basic elements 
weighing against monitoring: privacy and burden. The discussion 
focuses on how lawmakers and judges have traditionally examined 
these considerations. As Part III will explain, these two factors are 
evolving in the face of increasingly digital businesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
97. Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Protection for 
Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 353, 353–54 (2011). 
98. Cf. David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, 
and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1415 n.6, 1429 (2011) (discussing Deepwater Hori- 
zon in the context of prior penalties). 
99. See, e.g., David Kamin, Legislating Crisis, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 34 (Frank Fa- 
gan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017). 
100. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely 
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 361 (2010) (“We find 
that organizations are more likely to follow through on their commitments to self-regulate when 
they (and their competitors) are subject to heavy regulatory surveillance . . . .”). 
101. See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 268–286 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith, 
eds., 2005) (discussing the challenges of deterrence with boundedly rational actors); Edward Ru- 
bin, Can the Obama Administration Renew American Regulatory Policy?, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 357, 
393 (2011) (discussing the end of President Reagan’s rational actor theory of government). 
102. For a review of the legislation and regulatory responses following these incidents, see, for 
example, Van Loo, supra note 2. 
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1. Privacy 
 
Historically, a primary source of resistance to regulatory 
monitoring was business owners’ privacy interests.103 This resistance 
can be seen in early legislative discussions. In the early 1800s, for 
instance, steamboat engineers consistently took their own lives and 
those of thousands of passengers by operating their boats while 
“ignorant, careless and usually drunk.”104 One congressman framed 
proposed inspection legislation as being about “[w]hether we shall 
permit a legalized, unquestioned, and peculiar class in the community 
to go on committing murder at will,” but the bill still met with 
considerable resistance on the basis of “the sanctity of private property 
rights.”105 
The interest in protecting businesses from state searches was 
not as strong as that for personal matters. In Oklahoma Press 
Publishing Co. v. Walling, the Department of Labor sought to compel a 
media company to produce a broad array of books and records.106 In 
rejecting the company’s claim of a Fourth Amendment privacy 
violation, the Supreme Court observed, “[I]t has been settled that 
corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections 
which private individuals have in these and related matters.”107 
Additionally, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence omitted noncriminal 
searches until the twentieth century.108 
Despite the lower level of privacy-related protections afforded to 
businesses, courts eventually added regulatory monitoring of 
businesses to the sphere of activities protected by the Constitution. In 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment protected a plumber from a suspicionless, warrantless 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspection of his site of 
business.109 Business owners’ privacy interests remain a factor that 
weighs against routine administrative monitoring of businesses. For 
 
 
 
103. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 63, 143–49 (Henry Steele Commager, ed., 8th ed. 
1968). 
104. See Burke, supra note 95, at 11. 
105. Id. at 21. 
106. 327 U.S. 186, 189 (1946). 
107. Id. at 205. 
108. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (requiring a warrant for 
health and safety inspections, and overturning Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959)). 
109. See 436 U.S 307, 321 (1978) (observing that the enforcement needs must be weighed 
against the privacy guarantees of an inspection statute); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 
541, 543 (1967) (“The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to 
go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial prop- 
erty.”). 
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some courts, privacy includes maintaining sole possession of valuable 
data and retaining customers who might become disgruntled if their 
information were passed on to government officials.110 
 
2. Burden 
 
Another long-standing argument against monitoring has 
perhaps increased in importance in the modern era: burden. The 
business costs of designing and managing internal compliance systems, 
as well as taxpayer dollars used to fund a labor-intensive oversight 
force, can be substantial.111 
In analyzing burden, the Supreme Court has considered 
whether the information requested is “limited in scope, relevant in 
purpose, and specific.”112 The state entity collecting the information is 
expected to minimize the burden in providing the information.113 As a 
judicial matter, the burden analysis imposes “rather minimal 
limitations on administrative action.”114 A federal court did, however, 
strike down a city ordinance largely due to excess burden because it 
required Airbnb to hand over data, each month, about every host in New 
York.115 
The possibility of excess burden weighed heavily against 
granting authority for early safety inspections.116 Legislatures 
sometimes have attempted to specify that the scope of authorized 
monitoring is exceeded if “the information or records requested are 
unusually voluminous in nature.”117 Beyond concerns about preventing 
a regulatory “fishing expedition,” lawmakers weigh arguments about 
 
 
 
110. See, e.g., Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (di- 
viding Airbnb’s privacy interests into “competitive” in terms of keeping data from rivals, and “cus- 
tomer relations” in wanting to retain customers). 
111. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2075, 2102–03 (2016) (“Although figures vary widely depending upon company size, average 
compliance budgets are in the millions of dollars for multinational companies and for companies 
in regulated industries.”). 
112. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 544; see also Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 
411, 415 (1984) (reiterating a similar standard for production of records). 
113. See Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per 
curiam) (offering as one of the explanations for upholding the FTC’s line of business reporting that 
“the Commission had sufficiently minimized the respondents’ burden of compliance with the re- 
porting requirement”). 
114. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545. 
115. Airbnb, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 490–92. 
116. See Burke, supra note 95, at 11 (discussing concerns about costs to business owners of 
inspecting steamboats). 
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (“A court . . . may quash or modify such order, if the infor- 
mation or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order 
otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.”). 
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efficiency due to the economic benefits that lower business costs can 
bring to society.118 
In summary, core considerations weighing in favor of monitoring 
are (1) a compelling public interest, (2) information asymmetries, and 
(3) publicly salient failed self-regulation. These factors are present at 
least to some extent in some of the most prominent early extensions of 
monitoring authority. Pushing against those three considerations are 
(4) privacy and (5) the economic costs of monitoring. A more systematic 
study would be necessary to assess the relative influence and 
pervasiveness of each of these five factors across all historical instances 
of monitoring legislation. In theory, these five factors could also enable 
the type of cost-benefit analysis used throughout the administrative 
state for deciding whether to take a given course of regulatory action.119 
In the absence of any such systematic analysis, as the Supreme Court 
has explained, “Time and experience have forcefully taught that the 
power to inspect . . . is of indispensable importance . . . .”120 
 
II. FACTORS IN FAVOR OF MONITORING PLATFORMS 
 
The previous Part explained how monitoring of businesses is 
common among regulators and outlined the factors for and against 
monitoring. This Part begins to apply those factors to platforms run by 
large technology companies such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook. 
Although many scholars have analogized platform risks to those in 
heavily   monitored   industries   such   as   pharmaceuticals,121    oil,122 
 
 
 
118. Airbnb, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 491. 
119. On the use, importance, and challenges of cost-benefit analysis, see generally Michael A. 
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
120. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (stating that there is “unanimous 
agreement” for routine periodic inspections of all structures to achieve effective compliance). 
Courts have consistently upheld agencies’ ability to collect regulatory information. See, e.g., Do- 
novan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313 
(1972) (gun sales); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor sales). 
121. Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 122 (2017) (“Given the close 
analog between complex pharmaceuticals and sophisticated algorithms, leaving algorithms unreg- 
ulated could lead to the same pattern of crisis and response.”). 
122. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, 
and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1154 (“Just as oil made machines 
and factories run in the Industrial Age, Big Data makes the relevant machines run in the Algo- 
rithmic Society.”); Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the 
Surveillance Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213, 215 (2017) (comparing the surveillance economy to 
raw material extraction from the public domain and to European sovereigns’ financing of explor- 
ers, who by “naming and staking claim to hitherto undiscovered lands marked those lands as own- 
able resources and their contents as available for harvesting or capture”); Dennis D. Hirsch, The 
Glass House Effect: Big Data, the New Oil, and the Power of Analogy, 66 ME. L. REV. 373, 375 
(2014) (noting that tankers spill oil, despoiling coastlines and waters, in a manner analogous to 
1586 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1563 
 
 
transportation,123 and finance,124 those discussions are focused on other 
dimensions of the regulatory analogy and thus pay little if any attention 
to regulatory information collection. 
The analysis of platforms serves several purposes. It provides a 
case study to flesh out the normative framework for monitoring. 
Moreover, the study of platforms provides a window into some of the 
dynamics facing monitoring in an increasingly digital world. Finally, 
the considerable influence of technology firms adds immediacy and 
practical importance to this case study as policymakers worldwide move 
toward regulatory oversight. If implemented, a monitoring program 
would initially enable learning to develop new regulatory standards 
and later provide a mechanism for adapting regulations to a fast- 
changing industry.125 In terms of enforcement, monitoring would serve 
to help regulators identify platforms’ violations of broad existing laws, 
such as general consumer protection and antitrust statutes,126 as well 
as violations of any future platform-specific regulation. 
 
A. Public Interest in Preventing a Harm 
 
Scholars have identified numerous justifications for regulating 
portions of the platform economy. This Section looks at four of these: 
(1) privacy violations, (2) election engineering, (3) consumer harms, and 
(4) speech moderation. Many of these justifications fall under 
conventional rationales for monitoring—to correct a market failure or 
protect other core values.127 Each is examined for whether it 
demonstrates a public interest in need of prevention—meaning that ex 
post court remedies, or waiting for the harm and punishing the 
wrongdoer afterwards, would prove inadequate. 
 
 
 
how large companies like Target, Uber, and Equifax have allowed hackers access to hundreds of 
millions of credit cards, passwords, and social security numbers). 
123. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Regulating Tech Platforms: A Blueprint for Reform, GREAT 
DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE 3, 5 (2018), https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/up- 
loads/2018/03/Regulating-Tech-Platforms-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA2T-LQVQ] (analogizing 
tech platforms’ antitrust challenges to railroads, public accommodations, and utilities). 
124. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-to-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as Cyber- 
Social Systems, 93 IND. L.J. 1211 (2018) (comparing digital service providers to major financial 
institutions); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the 
Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018) (analogizing platforms to 
finance and telecommunications). 
125. On how monitoring informs policymaking, see Van Loo supra note 2. 
126. See infra note 337 and accompanying text. 
127. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF  THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 4 (2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/cir- 
culars/A4/a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5EL-69C5] (“Correcting market failures is a reason for regu- 
lation . . . . Other possible justifications include improving the functioning of government, remov- 
ing distributional unfairness, or promoting privacy and personal freedom.”). 
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1. Privacy Harms to Individuals 
 
Platforms can harm consumers, purposefully or accidentally, by 
allowing their data to reach third parties. Platforms purposefully sell 
personal data, or the advertising insights gained from analyzing such 
data, to third parties.128 Facial recognition technologies can identify 
customers when they  enter an establishment, and algorithms can 
search a customer’s past transactions to determine whether a sales 
representative should approach.129 Wearable devices, such as FitBit, 
collect health and behavior data for use by insurance companies setting 
monthly premiums, lenders establishing credit rates, and even 
employers deciding whether to hire.130 While this data may benefit 
consumers by tailoring products, data sharing can also enable 
companies to charge consumers more by identifying consumers that are 
naïve or complacent.131 
Firms’ privacy practices also implicate nonmonetary values. 
Facebook recently came under criticism for allowing a data broker, 
Cambridge Analytica, to obtain millions of users’ account information. 
Cambridge Analytica then used that data to promote election 
candidates. From a legal perspective, this conduct was problematic 
because Facebook’s privacy disclosures did not make it clear that data 
would be used for such purposes.132 
Privacy harms also occur when a firm fails to safeguard data. By 
infiltrating the systems of Uber, Yahoo, and other platforms, hackers 
have acquired hundreds of millions of people’s names, social security 
numbers, birth dates, addresses, credit card information, and other 
personal information.133 
Once data is stolen, it can be resold on the dark web, living on 
indefinitely in the hands of thieves.134 Regardless of future government 
 
 
 
 
128. See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 12, at 1676. 
129. See Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (2015) (“We live in a world where every action we take can be observed, 
recorded, analyzed, and stored.”). 
130. See Alexandra Troiano, Wearables and Personal Health Data Putting a Premium on Your 
Privacy, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1715, 1715 (2017). 
131. See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing transactional harms). 
132. Congress and the FTC have given firms broad legal leeway to use consumer data as they 
like—so long as they are candid about it. Morgan Hochheiser, The Truth Behind Data Collection 
and Analysis, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 32, 35–37 (2015). The efficacy of this 
approach is considered in the discussion of self-regulation. See infra Section II.C. 
133. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Attack Exposes Data of 143 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2017, at A1. 
134. See Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the 
Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1090 (2017) (“Modern criminals use the dark web to carry out 
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intervention, hacking victims may need to take additional precautions. 
Impersonators have opened various accounts, left bills unpaid, and even 
committed crimes that later appear on innocent parties’ records.135 
Some of these issues have taken the victims years, and many court 
battles, to resolve.136 The stress of a criminal accusation cannot be 
undone—to the extent that “the process is the punishment,”137 the 
ultimate arrest of the perpetrator would prove insufficient. Further, the 
victim is left in fear of it all happening again because the data could 
remain available to criminals. 
Thus, platforms implicate an important public interest in 
privacy. And ex post remedies appear inadequate. Platforms’ privacy 
implications therefore demonstrate the basic elements of a public 
interest in prevention. 
 
2. Influencing Civic Behavior: Election Engineering 
 
Several years after Jonathan Zittrain warned that Facebook 
could alter the outcome of “a hypothetical hotly contested future 
election,”138 the Russian government attempted just that. From 2015 to 
2016, computer scientists sponsored by the Russian government 
created social media accounts posing as Black Lives Matter supporters 
or the Tennessee Republican Party, gaining hundreds of thousands of 
followers.139 They deployed bots, or autonomous programs that interact 
with computer systems, to create and spread messages.140 By one count, 
these bots reached 126 million voters in an effort to spur support for 
Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump.141 
Concerns about online platforms influencing elections find 
additional support in experimental research. One study examined 
whether the Facebook news feeds influenced voting behavior in the 
 
 
 
 
 
technology-driven crimes, such as computer hacking, identity theft, credit card fraud, and intel- 
lectual property theft.”). 
135. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, A 17-Year Nightmare of Identity Theft Finally Results in 
Criminal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at A10. 
136. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Internalizing Identity Theft, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009); 
Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
1227, 1244 (2003). 
137. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER 
CRIMINAL COURT (1979). 
138. Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 335, 336 (2014). 
139. Apuzzo & LaFraniere, supra note 8. 
140. Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Broad Reach of Campaign by Russians Is Disclosed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2017, at B1. 
141. Id. 
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2010 congressional elections.142 The researchers inserted graphics with 
voting booth locations and friends’ “I Voted” buttons in some users’ 
feeds, while withholding such graphics from others.143 The results 
suggest that about 340,000 people voted nationwide as a result of the 
interventions. Those results seem modest compared to the study’s sixty 
million participants, but recall that ten years earlier, the 2000 
presidential election was decided by 537 votes.144 It is further possible 
that alternative intervention designs could produce a greater impact, 
particularly if messages are targeted at certain political groups.145 The 
study thus demonstrates the potential for an election to be “quietly 
engineered” using platforms.146 
There is no clearly sufficient remedy when election tampering 
becomes observable after the fact. A repeat election would surely prove 
contentious and would risk undermining stability and public faith in 
elections.147 Additionally, it might take months or years to reveal the 
manipulation, as it did with Russian tampering.148 Influences on civic 
behavior thus likely satisfy the requirement of a public interest worth 
preventing. 
 
3. Transactional Harms 
 
Platforms drive diverse economic activities. Search engines such 
as Expedia help people decide what to buy and for how much. Bitcoin 
exchanges and financial apps like Venmo enable transactions to occur 
through new payment systems. Consumers are beginning to outsource 
shopping and finance to digital butlers, or robo-advisers, which find the 
best deals and purchase products when the consumer simply clicks 
“approve.”149   Although  they  bring  great  benefits,  these  emerging 
 
 
 
142. Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political 
Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295, 295 (2012). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. See Zittrain, supra note 138, at 336–39. 
146. See id. at 339 (referring back to the hypothetical election). 
147. See Jeffrey A. Karp et al., Dial ‘F’ for Fraud: Explaining Citizens’ Suspicions About Elec- 
tions, 53 ELECTORAL STUD. 11, 17 (2018) (explaining that doubts regarding the “integrity and se- 
curity” of the election process and management can “erode citizen’s trust” in political actors, the 
government and democracy). 
148. See Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia 
Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/pol- 
itics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/Y3AT-845A] (providing a 
timeline which illustrates that the federal investigation into Russian tampering did not begin until 
months after Trump won the 2016 presidential election). 
149. See generally Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 309 (2017). 
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intermediaries  can  skew  information  in  ways  that  cause  costly 
mistakes. 
Consumer harms can, in the extreme, lead to physical injuries. 
For example, investigative journalists uncovered in 2017 that 
TripAdvisor had removed posts that talked about crimes committed in 
hotels.150 Many guests had, for instance, posted about being assaulted 
and robbed at a vacation resort in Riviera Maya, Mexico, but had their 
posts deleted.151 Subsequent travelers chose to go to the same resort 
after reading TripAdvisor’s redacted reviews, only to become victims of 
those same crimes.152 Because unfavorable reviews would deter hotels 
from advertising on the site, TripAdvisor may have had incentives to 
delete reviews alleging assault.153 Regardless of the motives, when 
business practices jeopardize personal safety, legal design principles 
generally prefer ongoing monitoring.154 
Other platform-facilitated transactions result in discrimination 
and monetary harms. Repeated studies found that Airbnb hosts are 
more likely to cancel reservations from guests thought to be racial 
minorities.155 Investigations faulted Amazon and Facebook for 
deceiving consumers, including many children, into paying hundreds or 
thousands of dollars through in-app purchases, which allow a video 
game player to purchase additional abilities or time with a quick 
click.156 Facebook employees referred to such practices as “friendly 
fraud,” and called children racking up thousands of dollars in fees 
“whales,” a term used by casinos to refer to heavy gamblers.157 
 
 
 
150. Raquel Rutledge & Andrew Mollica, Misery in Mexico: Tourists Say TripAdvisor Blocked 
Warnings, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 2017, at A1. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. This can be seen in safety-related agencies that overwhelmingly rely on monitoring, such 
as the FAA, FDA, and OHSA. See generally Van Loo, supra note 2. 
155. See Press Release, Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous., Department Of Fair Employment And 
Housing Reaches Agreement With Former Airbnb Host Who Cancelled Reservation Texting “One 
word says it all. Asian.” (July 13, 2017), https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/up- 
loads/sites/32/2017/07/2017-07-13-Suh-Airbnb-Press-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y38-PT9F] 
[hereinafter Airbnb Agreement]; infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. Platforms may also 
facilitate other forms of discrimination, such as that based on age. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Age Dis- 
crimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 (2019). 
156. See F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL10654030, at *11 (W.D. 
Wash. July 22, 2016) (holding Amazon accountable for third-party app developers’ charges through 
its app store and on Kindle products); I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989, 996 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (class action regarding in-app purchases made by minors on Facebook). 
157. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Leave to Intervene and to 
Unseal Judicial Documents at Ex. K, Bohannon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-cv-01894-BLF (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 24, 2019), ECF 193-6 (“Friendly Fraud – what it is, why it’s challenging, and why you 
shouldn’t try to block it.”); Facebook’s Opposition to The Center for Investigative Reporting Inc.’s 
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At a more subtle level, search results generated for a product on 
Amazon, eBay, or other sites can subtly cause consumers to pay more 
simply by making it harder to find the best deal or offering confusing 
product specifications, through a tweak to the search algorithm.158 
Those practices have come to light in part because academics have 
occasionally obtained unusual access to internal company data.159 From 
a theoretical perspective, a growing number of antitrust scholars have 
argued that the monopoly power of online platforms may be used to 
bankrupt competitors and ultimately lead to higher consumer prices 
and less innovation.160 
Assuming the harm will eventually become known and 
quantified, consumer protection laws have often viewed ex post 
remedies as sufficient for monetary harms.161 Unlike with death or 
physical injury, the breaching party can, in theory, pay money 
afterwards or perform specific acts to put the other party in the position 
she would have been in had the harm never occurred. In ex post 
transactional regimes, regulators tend to rely more on direct-to- 
consumer disclosures, in which the business is required to provide 
clarifying information to consumers, such as the price per unit on 
grocery shelves.162 Similarly, the law handles many antitrust violations, 
such as price fixing, through ex post remedies.163 The regulator, mostly 
the FTC at the federal level, does not routinely collect  nonpublic 
information in these transactional contexts.164 
But lawmakers have concluded that ongoing monitoring is best 
for some types of transactional harms. In consumer protection, banking 
 
 
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Unseal Judicial Documents at Ex. OO, Bohannon v. Face- 
book, Inc., No. 12-cv-01894-BLF (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2018), ECF 179-3 (“Would you refund this whale 
ticket?”). 
158. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the 
Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 428–29 (2009); Michael Dinerstein et al., Consumer Price Search 
and Platform Design in Internet Commerce 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20415, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20415.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS33-77T4]. 
159. See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 158, at 433 (relying on a company’s decision to share 
nonpublic cost and sales data); Dinerstein et al., supra note 158, at 2 (same). 
160. See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND 
PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 11–13 (2016); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, 
Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1051, 1051 (2017); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s An- 
titrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716–17 (2017); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 
72 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (2019); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (2015); John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
513, 515 (2018). 
161. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Consumer Protection Without Law, 33 REGULATION 26, 27 (2010). 
162. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 653–55 (2011) (discussing examples of such disclosure regimes). 
163. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 160, at 722–25. 
164. See supra Section I.A (providing an overview of monitoring across regulators); infra Sec- 
tion IV.A (discussing the FTC’s regulatory approach). 
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regulators such as the CFPB routinely visit and collect reports from 
banks in search of unfair and deceptive acts or discriminatory 
lending.165 In antitrust, companies must submit sizeable mergers to 
authorities for approval, rather than completing the merger and letting 
authorities or competitors sue afterwards.166 And the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”), a private company, must obtain regulatory 
approval before changing the rules for trading stocks—in part because 
of its monopolistic nature, which may increase harms such as 
undetected self-dealing and compromised access to the market.167 
Some platforms arguably present comparable shortcomings with 
respect to ex post remedies. Amazon has gatekeeper and network 
structures, along with difficult-to-observe consumer harms, that raise 
regulatory challenges similar to stock exchanges.168 A pure ex post 
approach poses notable challenges, illustrated by the European 
Commission’s twelve-year process to fine Google $2 billion—the largest 
monetary penalty in antitrust history—for crushing once-promising 
startups.169 Given that digital industries provide first-mover 
advantages and network effects,170 a startup has a small window of 
opportunity to compete that may have closed by the time regulators or 
courts have obtained the information needed to intervene ex post. 
Overall, the heterogeneity of harms makes it difficult to classify 
platforms’ transactional conduct broadly as being better regulated by 
monitoring or ex post litigation. From an institutional perspective, 
however, at least some large online platform harms—such as removing 
safety-related information, causing significant financial harms, and 
stifling startup businesses—reflect those that have driven 
policymakers to identify a public interest in preventing the harm using 
monitoring. 
 
4. Speech Harms 
 
Online platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube direct the flow of communications among users and must 
decide what information to allow on their platforms. Some editing of 
content  implicates  state  accountability.  For  example,  in  2016,  an 
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onlooker recorded a police officer shooting Alton Sterling, who was 
being held to the ground by other officers. In another incident, the 
girlfriend of Philando Castile filmed the aftermath of his fatal shooting 
during a traffic stop.171 These videos’ widespread circulation prompted 
nationwide protests, Department of Justice investigations, and police 
department reforms, including more widespread body camera 
requirements.172 But the movement came close to being technologically 
blocked. Shortly after the Castile video was posted, Facebook 
moderators removed it for being too graphic. They reposted it twenty 
minutes later with a viewer discretion warning,173 but had the platform 
gone with its initial decision to take the content down, it could have 
amounted to a significant speech harm. 
Platforms also curate content directed at individuals or groups. 
Since their early years, Facebook and Twitter have sought to remove 
harmful content including racist comments and other hateful speech.174 
Yet scholars have argued that these measures have not gone far enough 
to address revenge porn, cyber harassment, and “troll armies” designed 
to intimidate critics into silence.175 
Internet intermediaries have great discretion as moderators 
because the Communications Decency Act protects them from liability 
for users’ content.176 For instance, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the 
plaintiff sought damages because AOL failed to remove defamatory 
posts from its message boards.177 The court held AOL immune from 
such suits under the Act, paving the way for broad website operator 
discretion as to whether and how to curate content.178 
Moreover, platforms’ filtering role has recently intensified. For 
many years, Twitter moderators allowed white supremacists to use the 
site but would remove any post deemed offensive.179  In December of 
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2017, however, the company began to suspend many accounts based on 
the account holder’s offline persona, a move dubbed “#TwitterPurge.”180 
In early 2018, Facebook announced that it would play an editorial role 
in deciding which news was sufficiently high quality to reach users, 
rather than solely letting the number of clicks decide.181 
Although online platforms are private domains, the moderation 
of online content has free speech implications. When private actors 
perform a public function, such as by operating corporate towns, some 
courts have deemed them functionally equivalent to public actors.182 
But courts are reluctant to find public functions, and in analogous 
contexts, such as shopping malls and public television channels, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that a private entity does not 
necessarily perform a public function merely because it holds a forum 
open to the public.183 
A recent Court ruling underscores the free speech tension in 
content moderation. In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court struck 
down a state statute barring sex offenders from participating in social 
networks.184 The Court observed that to prevent “access to social media 
altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate 
exercise of First Amendment rights.”185 Because the state—not the 
platform itself—blocked access in this case, it is unclear what 
remaining ability the state has to regulate platforms’ own restrictions 
on access and content.186 
In the pre-digital era, the harm of having one’s speech blocked 
or being subject to harassment could not necessarily be undone. 
Nonetheless, the law has predominantly relied on ex post judicial 
remedies, such as fines and injunctions, to regulate harassment.187 
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Fully evaluating the wisdom of that emphasis is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it is possible that the reliance on ex post measures is 
partly explained by the impracticability of monitoring all potential 
harassment in real time. Offline harassment can occur during a 
completely private interaction, whereas harassment that happens on 
platforms introduces a third party—the information technology. 
Therefore, monitoring could be more plausible in the digital context. 
Facebook, for example, has developed tools to identify harassment, 
including tracking IP addresses to recognize when blocked users open 
a new account in order to message the same person who blocked 
them.188 
Overall, the strength of the public interest factor varies by the 
four categories of harm discussed above. Harms such as privacy and 
election meddling are in need of heightened prevention. Some 
transactional harms and speech harms have stronger countervailing 
considerations, such as the possibility of ex post monetary 
compensation and a preference for not stamping out speech in advance. 
But many transactional harms merit prevention, and even some speech 
harms might justify monitoring of the platform’s practices. A holistic 
view of platforms suggests that they meet the basic threshold of 
implicating public harms worthy of prevention. 
 
B. Information Asymmetries 
 
The second major reason regulators might monitor an 
industry—information asymmetries—is potentially heightened for 
online platforms given their limited observability as compared to other 
monitored industries. Absent a monitoring regime, the government is 
dependent on how observable a harm is by either those harmed or some 
third party, such as journalists. However, the more consumers cannot 
see what is happening to others, and the more complex the underlying 
decisionmaking process, the more difficult it is for individuals to 
monitor a company’s behavior. One reason why the CFPB regularly 
examines bank records for personal financial harms, even small fees, is 
that consumers will not necessarily know they are harmed and would 
have difficulty knowing whether someone else with the same credit 
score got a different deal.189 
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Platforms demonstrate incredible complexity through their 
individualized black-box interfaces.190 Yet the visibility of platform 
harms varies by category. Consumers cannot easily observe security 
precautions and privacy because, by its nature, a company does not 
share such information publicly.191 For many instances of identity theft, 
victims may learn of the harm once they receive a bill for unauthorized 
purchases or observe an unexplained depletion in their bank account. 
But consumers will not necessarily know when their data has been 
hacked. It took years before the public learned of millions of 
compromised accounts at Yahoo and Uber.192 Indeed, companies have 
taken steps to hide such security incidents. Uber paid a ransom to keep 
the breach quiet.193 
Nor is the selling or use of personal data easily observable. 
Consumers may never know that they were routed to a less helpful call 
center, charged more for a loan, or had their data sold to a third-party 
data broker such as Cambridge Analytica. Companies are not required 
to disclose to customers that others paid lower prices.194 
While elections, transactional consumer harms, and some 
categories of speech harms may have observable elements, these harms 
are predominantly opaque. They are marginally more observable than 
privacy harms in that voters can report questionable election messages 
in social media feeds, posters can see the number of retweets or video 
views to infer silencing, and small businesses can run Google searches 
to learn if they have been delisted.195 Sometimes platforms even notify 
users that their post has been removed, or could be required to do so by 
substantive law.196 Explicit discrimination can be observed by the 
victim, as when an Airbnb host cancelled a California mountain cabin 
rental minutes before the guest arrived by texting, “One word says it 
all. Asian.”197 
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The challenge with many means of observation is that 
“companies fastidiously study consumers and, increasingly, personalize 
every aspect of the consumer experience.”198 If an Airbnb host denies an 
individual’s request for lodging, it is unclear whether other consumers 
of different races received preferential treatment. However, insight is 
possible with the right information and access. One field experiment 
used fake accounts and over six thousand messages to determine that 
on average, hosts were sixteen percent less likely to accept reservations 
from distinctly African-American names, even when every other aspect 
of the guest’s profile was identical.199 Airbnb swiftly blocked the 
academics’ accounts, and platforms have even more sophisticated 
techniques to identify fake accounts.200 Other researchers seeking to 
understand related problems, such as why Google shows lower-paying 
job ads to women than to men, have faced similar barriers of access to 
the relevant nonpublic information.201 As a result, relying on the 
cooperation of platforms to share necessary information will not 
necessarily suffice to identify and understand harms. 
Any two social media feeds may differ greatly based on the users’ 
digital profiles, including makeup of followers and past clicks.202 The 
products or election advertisements users see may also vary. Any given 
person has limited knowledge of other user experiences, since most only 
have access to their single feed. Consequently, Instagram moderators 
may deprioritize or bury a post in users’ feeds without the poster 
knowing. Facebook voluntarily announced its platform’s ability to 
influence elections, although it could have withheld that private 
information.203 Essentially, platforms can effectively silence tweets, 
tailor election news, or aid sellers in selectively charging higher 
advertised prices, all while obscuring that conduct from affected 
individuals. 
It would be a complex undertaking for the harmed party to 
identify and track the many subtle ways that any two feeds differ in 
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terms of the ordering, timing, and composition of items displayed. 
Analyzing millions of feeds would require a sophisticated analysis with 
unprecedented access to many individuals’ personal accounts.204 
Individuals and small businesses, in particular, would likely be unable 
to monitor effectively. 
Even if users observed that their business was deprioritized or 
that an advertisement was tailored, they would not necessarily know 
why. Platforms use complex, continually changing algorithms to 
produce web search results and social feed content.205 Users would 
likely be unable to determine whether they were losing out in the search 
results based on the competitive merits or due to the gatekeeper’s desire 
to lessen competition. 
These information asymmetries reflect those in other monitored 
industries. Like social media feeds, consumer financial products are 
tailored to the individual.206 A borrower generally cannot attribute 
higher mortgage rates to illegal factors, such as race, or may be unable 
to understand the fine print terms that impose hidden fees. 
Additionally, by some accounts, companies such as Google and 
Apple have taken corporate secretiveness to new levels in an effort to 
prevent competitors from copying innovations.207 They use 
nondisclosure and nondisparagement agreements liberally, and 
develop tools for hiding information.208 One Uber software program 
identified transportation regulators; when they opened the app, Uber 
would create a “ghost screen” displaying fake drivers. After the 
regulator requested a ride, the cars would disappear from the screen, 
giving the impression that cars were no longer available.209 Platforms 
can thus deploy legal and technological tools not only to limit public 
information access, but also to tailor user experiences such that one 
external observer’s inferences would be irrelevant to another’s. Given 
the intensely secretive culture and inscrutability of digital technologies, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204. Of course, data for some accounts is publicly available, but Facebook would be able to 
control which accounts are subject to manipulation and whether that data is available publicly. 
205. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 190, at 1168. 
206. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 835 (2019). 
207. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 67 
(2015) (describing Google’s secretiveness); Tom C. W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 911, 914 (2012) (describing Apple’s secretiveness). 
208. See, e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A 
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 56–57 (2019). 
209. Mike Isaac, Uber Uses Tech to Deceive Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2017, 
at A1. 
2019] MONITORING IN THE SURVEILLANCE AGE 1599 
 
 
there may be no other industry with greater public-private information 
asymmetries than online platforms.210 
 
C. Self-Regulation 
 
Historically, monitoring legislation has followed prominent legal 
violations by businesses—presumably based on the conclusion that the 
prior reliance on self-regulation was faulty or at least politically 
unacceptable.211 By that basic measure, the platform economy, like 
more heavily regulated industries, has failed the test of self- 
regulation.212 Indeed, an industry built in part by skirting the law and 
evading regulators, with a prominent motto of “move fast and break 
things,”213 is an unlikely candidate for self-regulation. But before 
jumping to the alternative of a full regulatory monitoring regime, it is 
necessary to consider not only the effectiveness of monitoring, but also 
the different versions of industry self-regulation as embraced in the 
literature or utilized by the FTC: public disclosure and private third- 
party monitoring. 
 
1. Private Monitoring and Transparency 
 
Observers have proposed private monitoring regimes or making 
information publicly available, thereby letting markets or private 
actors hold businesses accountable.214 One version of this is mandated 
disclosures to the end user. Also, by faulting Facebook for being unclear 
with users about what would happen to their data, the FTC pushes the 
platform to disclose risks and harms.215 Well-designed disclosures can 
help, but they have traditionally performed poorly because hardly 
anyone reads the fine print of contracts.216 Even if people did, they likely 
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would  not  understand  the  contents,  and  even  simpler  prominent 
disclosures often fail to realize their intended purpose.217 
Disclosures might also target public or third-party experts, 
which would require platforms to make some part of their underlying 
code publicly available.218 Private parties would then periodically 
observe platforms in a kind of crowd-sourced monitoring. Disclosure- 
based regulation is one of the most widely supported interventions, both 
among policymakers and legal scholars, because it preserves freedom of 
choice.219 However, without other legal reforms and careful design, such 
disclosures have limits because voluntary third-party experts— 
including reputation websites—may lack resources or motivation.220 
Additionally, under any public disclosure regime, competitors would 
acquire any information released, meaning that such information would 
need to be more limited.221 As a result, after a company has 
transgressed, its settlement agreement with a public entity often 
requires the hiring of a private third-party monitor to assess 
compliance.222 
The FTC applied both mandated disclosures and private 
monitoring when it learned that Google and Facebook had violated 
privacy policies in 2011 and 2012. Facebook had allowed its users to 
keep their information private, but repeatedly made that information 
public.223 The consent orders required the companies to pay for third- 
party “assessments” of their compliance, with heightened privacy 
policies outlined in the settlement.224 
Facebook’s assessor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, upon reviewing 
Facebook’s online policy and direct assertions, submitted annual 
reports to the FTC verifying that Facebook was in full compliance and 
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taking the necessary precautions to safeguard user data.225 
Subsequently, evidence emerged that Facebook failed to protect privacy 
in accordance with its published policies, most prominently when one 
of its apps helped transfer millions of users’ data to Cambridge 
Analytica for psychological profiling during the 2016 presidential 
election.226 It is worth noting that Google and Facebook were able to 
comply with their third-party assessments by simply making assertions 
to the third party about their privacy policies, a process that falls short 
of a full audit.227 Thus, the performance of these regimes does not reflect 
how a more empowered third-party auditor would have performed. 
Perhaps a truly independent private third party could provide 
that benefit.228 Regulators other than the FTC have deployed more 
powerful private auditors with “unrestricted access” to the regulated 
entity’s documents.229 In theory, these private monitors could provide 
many of the benefits of public monitors, and indeed scholars have often 
proposed private rather than public monitoring of platforms.230 Private 
monitors have  the  advantage of  using  fewer public resources  and 
avoiding governmental acquisition of private information. 
Another common reason for preferring a disclosure-oriented or 
private third-party regime is that either regime would use monitors 
with more sophistication and resources than bureaucrats.231 After all, 
government agencies pay considerably less than Silicon Valley firms.232 
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Moreover, bureaucrats often have protected employment status, which 
has led critics to argue that regulators cannot easily update their 
workforce with training or more technologically savvy employees.233 
Many believe that a third-party regulatory regime would make it less 
likely that “the government will remain several steps behind.”234 In 
light of these advantages and the political obstacles to government 
regulation, wholly private monitoring could offer a sensible policy 
option. 
Nonetheless, private monitors also have several shortcomings. 
A company hired to monitor has incentives to please the customer 
paying the bills—which is typically the regulated entity.235 A secretive 
industry is also unmotivated to share its inner workings with another 
business or the public.236 Considering these factors and the empirically 
supported successes of government monitoring in other industries, it is 
likely that regulatory monitoring of platforms—or at least publicly 
accountable private monitors—would offer the best option as long as 
the government reflects democratic values. 
 
2. Regulatory Monitoring Design and Effectiveness 
 
One challenge for the typical analysis is that an incident of failed 
self-regulation does not mean that a direct monitoring regime would 
have done better. Companies still engage in substantial wrongdoing in 
heavily monitored industries. Despite having OCC and CFPB 
examiners on-site year-round, Wells Fargo employees opened millions 
of unauthorized  accounts in customers’  names for years until the 
publication of a Los Angeles Times exposé.237 Any platform-monitoring 
regime, even helped by the most sophisticated of private-sector 
analysts, would have limits.238 Despite these uncertainties, empirical 
studies of government inspections across different jurisdictions and 
 
 
 
233. Frank Ostroff, Change Management in Government, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2006, at 141 
(critiquing federal agencies for having inflexible workplaces that inhibit innovation and prioritize 
the avoidance of failure over promotion of exceptional performance). 
234. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 160, at 231. 
235. The agency usually has at least veto power over the choice. See Khanna & Dickinson, 
supra note 222, at 1723. On the related inadequate incentives of stock exchanges to monitor, as 
well as liability strategies to address such inadequacies, see Yesha Yadav, Oversight Failures in 
Securities Markets, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa- 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2754786     [https://perma.cc/FDX4-LPJY]. 
236. See supra Section II.B (discussing platforms’ secretive cultures). 
237. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo Not the Only Bank to Have Created Unauthorized Ac- 
counts—But Regulator Won’t Identify Others, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/la-fi-unauthorized-accounts-occ-20180608-story.html       [https://perma.cc/MGE6-KUMH]. 
238. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017) (dis- 
cussing limitations of auditing algorithms). 
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timeframes suggest that governmental monitoring increases 
compliance.239 
Critics’ points about a sophistication imbalance between 
government and private monitors have merit, but as a basis for 
resistance to government monitoring, the argument reflects a 
misconception about the operation of monitoring regimes. From a 
functional perspective, regulatory monitors utilize three main 
categories of information collection: direct observations, explanations, 
and self-regulatory processes. Direct observations would mean 
examining the activities, such as looking at how the factory machines 
operate, or perhaps monitoring various outputs, such as chemical 
discharge into air and ocean waters.240 The next level would require the 
business to explain how those specific operations function, perhaps 
mandating an  analysis performed by the  business. Instead,  many 
monitors focus on the third category: self-regulatory processes. For 
example, government inspectors ensure that offshore oil platforms 
install and use mandatory safety devices that prevent explosion by 
shutting down drilling if the machinery temperature rises too high.241 
They also look at whether training programs and internal procedures 
position employees to mitigate and respond to emergencies.242 
To apply a similar regime to digital platforms, a regulator would 
ask the platform to identify which internal organizational processes 
filter out foreign political ads, protect against hackers, or prevent 
racially discriminatory behavior. The monitor would ideally be 
technologically savvy, but even one without a strong technology 
background would be capable of analyzing organizational processes to 
determine whether firms were asking the right questions and 
measuring the right outputs. Some outputs would also be discernible to 
monitors since most platforms have live feeds or other means of 
communicating to management what is happening.243 
Dialogue would further allow government monitors to better 
comprehend complex algorithms. Regulatory monitors do not simply 
examine in silence, but as part of a dialectic process. Bank employees 
sometimes need to break down a complex new financial instrument so 
that the Federal Reserve examiner understands whether it violates the 
law or poses a new risk.244 Environmental inspectors “rely on industry 
 
 
239. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
240. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 98, 1426–27. 
241. See Hayes, supra note 56. 
242. 40 C.F.R. § 112.21 (2018). 
243. See generally Klonick, supra note 171 (discussing internal moderators’ roles). 
244. See PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 165 
(2015) (describing the complexity facing bank supervision). 
1604 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1563 
 
 
representatives to explain the technology at a facility.”245 Similarly, 
regulatory monitors could question platform coders or ask to see the 
internal reports that those coders produced. In the context of privacy, 
for instance, regulators could ask platforms to provide privacy impact 
assessments. They might also routinely ask the regulator to provide any 
updates to privacy practices within the prior six months, such as any 
new types of data collected or any new third parties that are receiving 
user data. 
To be clear, even after adopting these approaches, monitors of 
platforms may still have more blind spots than do monitors in other 
industries. But perfect regulatory understanding is not the standard. 
Instead, regulatory comprehension is better seen as existing along a 
spectrum. Without ex ante monitoring authority, regulators currently 
operate with minimal algorithmic knowledge. If monitoring increased 
that comprehension from five to fifty percent, regulators would lack 
total comprehension, but that increase would be a meaningful 
advancement. If a disclosure regime would move public oversight from 
five to ten percent comprehension, but with less burden and more 
political support, that is an alternative to be weighed—or an additional 
measure that could create a pluralistic public-private monitoring 
regime.246 
It is impossible to know precisely how far any particular regime 
would move a regulator along the comprehension spectrum. Nor does 
space allow for determining which items from the menu of monitoring 
options would work best for platforms—auditing raw complaints or 
assessing compliance systems, conducting on-site examinations, 
requiring remote report submissions, or other tactics. Indeed, the 
answer will vary by the type of harm and platform. But regulatory 
monitoring would certainly add a significant degree of knowledge to the 
current state of substantial real-time ignorance in the face of fast- 
shifting platforms. 
 
III. FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST MONITORING PLATFORMS 
 
The previous Part showed how the three criteria in favor of 
monitoring are met at a basic level, at least regarding some harms and 
platforms.  That  brings  the  analysis  to  two  main  considerations 
 
 
 
245. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP 
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 28–30, 77 (2011), 
https://www.sintef.no/globalassets/project/hfc/documents/gpo-oilcommission.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8QQ7-Z7SQ]. 
246. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the 
Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27, 30 (2019) (connecting public and private ordering options). 
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historically weighing against monitoring: privacy and burden. Each 
factor is complicated with respect to online platforms given their role in 
surveillance and their core product being information itself. 
 
A. Business Owners’ Privacy 
 
Historically, privacy weighed against monitoring due to the 
importance of the business owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy.247 
However, business owners’ privacy expectations have not restricted 
monitoring in other industries, including the routine collection of 
sensitive profit data for antitrust scrutiny.248 Is there any reason to 
think that business owners’ privacy interests carry extra weight for 
platforms? It helps to approach that question by looking at “the privacy 
interests of the people involved” rather than the privacy interests of the 
entity.249 
Perhaps the best argument is the enhanced role of intellectual 
property, a key legal tool deployed in platforms’ secretive cultures.250 A 
regulator that leaked valuable trade secrets would, in a sense, violate 
the business owners’ privacy interests.251 Although trade secrets and 
sensitive competitive information are exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act,252 businesses have exploited the Act to access FTC 
information, demonstrating commercial motivation to exploit 
monitoring data.253 Heightened secrecy can, however, be seen in other 
industries, such as finance, where investment strategies and business 
acquisitions are closely guarded.254 Any platform-monitoring regime 
would need to mitigate the spread of trade secrets by limiting 
information collected only to that necessary and limiting the sharing of 
any information once it is collected.255 
It is otherwise difficult to see how the type of information 
collected for regulatory oversight would meaningfully threaten 
business owners’ privacy. That information would be related to the 
technologies  deployed  and  the  company’s  interactions  with  users, 
 
 
 
 
247. Supra Section I.C.1. 
248. See supra Section I.A. 
249. See Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 33 (2014). 
250. See sources cited supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
251. See Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp. 3d 467, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019). 252. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2012). 
253. Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1405 (2016) (finding that thirty-four 
percent of FTC requests were from commercial entities). 
254. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 207, at 911. 
255. See, e.g., David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 208–10 (2010) 
(detailing the highly confidential nature of bank examinations). 
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rather than about the business owners’ personal lives.256 Early 
constitutional privacy protections of business records resulted from 
Fifth Amendment concerns about sole proprietors, and the Court 
declined to extend those protections to corporations.257 The Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leaves open the question of whether 
the collective entity should have privacy protections, but arguably 
“most corporations in most circumstances should not have a 
constitutional right to privacy.”258 Thus, to the extent the business 
owners are themselves users of the company’s technologies, the 
business owners’ personal privacy dovetails with the privacy of the 
platforms’ users. 
 
B. Users’ Privacy 
 
Privacy offers another increasingly important argument against 
monitoring: in collecting information from businesses, regulators may 
collect sensitive consumer data. As a starting point for the normative 
analysis, customers’ privacy has not prevented regulatory monitoring 
of sensitive personal information in other industries. The SEC, CFPB, 
and FDA, not to mention the Census Bureau and Internal Revenue 
Service, collect a broad range of sensitive financial, medical, and 
household data.259 However, platforms have a far greater quantity of 
personal data than businesses did when Congress extended monitoring 
authority in other industries. Commentators and the public now have a 
heightened concern about surveillance. Should these concerns change 
the analysis for platforms, or perhaps for regulatory monitoring more 
generally? 
Surveillance is a general term that focuses on the collection of 
personal information.260 It implicates regulatory monitoring in part 
because government agencies have often used platforms to surveil 
individuals—leading one commentator to depict the modern era as one 
of  “liquid  surveillance.”261   Technology  firms  have  given  the  state 
 
 
 
 
256. For more on the type of information collected, see infra Section IV.C. 
257. See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 841–44 (2005) 
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visibility into people’s associates and interests from social media 
behavior, spending habits from credit card statements, and a growing 
array of other details from smart-home device data.262 Surveillance 
could thus pose a problem for regulatory monitoring because the very 
transfer of information from technology companies to the government 
is associated with an overbearing bureaucracy violating an important 
right.263 
To weigh the real privacy risks of regulatory monitoring, it is 
instructive to draw two distinctions between regulatory monitoring and 
state surveillance. One distinction relates to the type of entity that is 
collecting the information. The other concerns the nature of the 
information collected. 
1. Organizational Distinction: Crime Agencies Versus Regulators 
From  an  entity  perspective,  business  regulators  should  be 
analyzed separately from crime agencies. Conflating these two types of 
entities is problematic because they have different institutional 
cultures regarding information collection. Crime agencies have 
regularly exceeded the bounds of public comfort with information 
collection. To provide a few examples: in 1968, the Supreme Court held 
in a prominent case, Katz v. United States, that federal agents had 
violated the Fourth Amendment by wiretapping a public pay phone 
without obtaining a warrant, and the case garnered significant 
attention;264 later, President Richard Nixon used federal law 
enforcement agencies to spy on political rivals and activist groups;265 
and more recently, former Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) analyst 
Edward Snowden leaked classified documents revealing that the NSA 
had  conducted  a  warrantless  search  of  electronic  communication 
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262. Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. 
REV. 577, 588 (2017); Kim & Telman, supra note 25, at 725–26; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers 
and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1090–91 (2002). Pal- 
antir alone has helped the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), FBI, NSA, and ICE detect drug 
distribution rings, profile people for airport searches, and identify criminal suspects. Sarah 
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263. See infra Section IV.C. 
264. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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George W. Bush to Edward Snowden, FED. LAW. Jul. 2016, at 59, http://www.fedbar.org/Image- 
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[https://perma.cc/EBP4-WKXS]. 
1608 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1563 
 
 
databases that included metadata from almost every U.S. citizen.266 
Public anger at these and other programs has led to a “patchwork of 
limits from disparate sources” now regulating access to various 
personal data sources, such as social media postings and “digital 
records of an individual’s movements.”267 
Whereas Congress has regularly constrained crime agency 
surveillance, it has repeatedly done the opposite with regulators, 
concluding that regulators underutilized the authority they already 
had.268 For instance, the FDA already had the ability to inspect food 
manufacturers when, in 2010, an estimated 1,939 people became 
seriously ill from salmonella in peanut butter, ice cream, spinach, and 
other products.269 Congress responded to the outcry with legislation 
stating that the FDA “shall increase the frequency of inspection of all 
facilities,” and requiring at least one inspection every three years for 
high-risk manufacturers.270 Similarly, federal authorities gained the 
power to inspect underground mines in 1941, but an explosion ten years 
later in Illinois that killed 119 miners prompted Congress to mandate 
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an annual inspection of each underground coal mine.271 Congress has 
imposed similar minimum annual monitoring of oil and gas 
platforms,272 underground mines,273 large banks,274 credit rating 
agencies,275 and nuclear plants.276 Notably, crime agency statutes do not 
contain such minimum surveillance stipulations.277 In short, as public 
choice theory suggests, regulators tend to undercollect information.278 
As a result, policymakers considering regulatory monitoring should 
have less organizational concern about overzealous government 
officials violating individuals’ privacy—including for any program 
involving regulatory monitoring of platforms. 
What about the possibility that business regulators would hand 
over personal information to crime agencies? The distinction between 
crime agencies and business regulators would matter less if business 
regulators shared all of the personal information collected with crime 
agencies. Regulators do sometimes share information with other law 
enforcement agencies for prosecuting criminal matters related to their 
mission. For instance, the FTC’s mission of protecting consumers 
implicates criminal fraud. When the agency identifies businesses 
engaging in fraud, it hands the matter over to the agency with the 
ability to prosecute criminal matters in court.279 Statutes often dictate 
these links between regulators and crime agencies. 
Beyond such mandated interagency sharing, the information 
transfer is limited by several factors. Most importantly, various 
statutes curtail how agencies can disclose information. The Privacy Act 
provides general limitations on an agency’s ability to disclose 
individuals’ records to other governmental agencies, except under 
enumerated exceptions.280 The Act also limits access within the agency, 
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allowing access only to those “who have a need for the record in the 
performance of their duties.”281 Many industry-specific statutes go 
further, such as requiring disclosure to the individual whose medical 
records were requested or prohibiting any use of those records “for any 
purpose other than the litigation or proceeding for which such 
information was requested.”282 Some of these statutes make it a 
criminal offense for government officials to disclose information 
collected. 
Two institutional factors further mitigate the concerns about 
handing over information. First, when regulators collect sensitive 
information, the monitoring group would be expected to establish 
firewalls. From an institutional perspective, agency divisions tend to be 
selective about what they share even when others in the same agency, 
such as enforcement attorneys, desire unfettered access.283 Even when 
they are supposed to work together and coordinate to prevent disasters, 
agencies have resisted coordinating functions.284 Since regulators’ 
employees would risk themselves breaking the law by inappropriately 
sharing personal information, the sharing of personal information 
should be seen as having significant motivational barriers. These and 
other sources of “internal administrative law”285 help to deter regulators 
from routinely passing information to crime agencies. 
Finally, crime agencies do not need regulators’ help to obtain 
access to extensive personal data. Through the maligned third-party 
doctrine, the Court has held that when people voluntarily share 
information  with  a  third  party,  they  usually  have  no  reasonable 
 
 
 
 
 
281. Id. § 552a(b)(1). 
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expectation of privacy in such information.286 Consequently, the 
Constitution provides minimal limits on crime agencies’ access to user 
data from platforms even without a warrant.287 The FBI, CIA, and other 
agencies have hired leading private-sector data brokers, such as 
Palantir, to amass and analyze large amounts of private data.288 
Therefore, regulatory monitoring implicates users’ privacy less than 
does crime surveillance due to agency cultural differences, crime 
agencies’ independent information access, and existing privacy laws 
that restrict regulators’ ability to hand over information. 
2. Information Distinction: Personal Versus Organizational 
Those concerned about potential monitoring harms to users’ 
privacy must also consider the type of information sought. One 
categorization is vital for monitoring in the digital era—whether the 
information collected is personal or organizational.289 That distinction 
is important because popular alarm about surveillance stems from the 
collection of personal—not business—data. 
There is no doubt that for some platform harms, data from user 
accounts would  be  vital. To  determine whether an algorithm  was 
discriminating improperly, for instance, the monitor would need some 
mechanism for at least inferring characteristics about users, such as 
race.290 Again, it bears emphasis that federal agencies face considerable 
political and legal pressures to safeguard personal data. Although the 
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Fourth Amendment overall provides minimal restrictions on regulatory 
information collection, it would be more likely to restrain regulators 
collecting personal information than business information.291 Various 
statutes have restricted government agencies above that floor. The 
Privacy Act, for example, imposes criminal penalties on government 
employees for improper use of personal data.292 The Stored 
Communications Act restricts government access to emails.293 And the 
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires 
annual independent information security evaluations of agencies, 
performed by the Inspector General.294 
Accordingly, regulators take precautions in handling personal 
data, such as firewalls and encryption. Furthermore, for some harms 
requiring access to user accounts, it may be possible to provide the data 
to the regulator in de-identified form, such as by replacing the name 
with a randomly generated number. Government agencies, like private 
businesses, have at times failed in their efforts to protect privacy, and 
anonymization has limits.295 But it is worth recognizing that de- 
identification can reduce the risks of regulatory analysis of some 
personal data when it is collected.296 
Of course, government entities, like businesses, are vulnerable 
to hacks and leaks.297 However, the legal constraints on agencies 
arguably go further than laws constraining private businesses, as the 
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“basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental 
officials.” 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Exactly what makes a search personal is undefined and “es- 
tablished by general social norms.” Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981). 
292. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
293. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012). 
294. Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, § 2(a), 128 
Stat. 3082 (2014) (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3555(a)–(b)) (specifying that for agencies with an 
Inspector General, the Inspector General will lead the annual evaluation). Federal agencies must 
also conduct privacy impact assessments for information systems that use personally identifiable 
information. E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012). 
295. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 15, at 2 (“Too much individual data is being collected, stored, 
and sometimes disclosed without anyone asking or answering some very important questions.”). If 
implemented poorly, anonymized data can reveal too much. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: 
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1719 (2010); Ira 
S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703 (2016). 
296. The challenges can largely be determined in advance for a given data set, and for difficult- 
to-anonymize categories of data, there are solutions that still allow for robust monitoring. Ohm 
provides five factors to weigh in deciding whether data can be anonymized. See Ohm, supra note 
295, at 1765–68. 
297. On government data breaches, and related concerns about agency data collection, see, for 
example, Kimberly A. Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient 
Solutions or the End of Privacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 866 (2017); Adam 
B. Thimmesch, Tax Privacy?, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 389 (2018). 
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Privacy Act only applies to government entities. Thus, while 
precautions must be taken and the risks involved in collecting personal 
data obviously must be considered, in weighing those risks it is 
important to recognize that regulators already have a legal structure in 
place for handling personal information. 
Additionally, unlike crime agencies—which need users’ 
identities to assess their personal targets—regulators are looking for 
wrongdoing by the business.298 Above all, regulators need business 
information, not personal information. They can analyze companies’ 
internal policies and procedures, or even examine the code behind 
various algorithms, without obtaining any user data. In theory, they 
could ask the business to conduct a particular quantitative analysis 
about, say, the number of fee complaints that Facebook received using 
the word “child,” without the regulator ever receiving any information 
about a particular user. In practice, regulators go to great lengths to 
minimize the collection of personally identifiable information, given 
their lesser need for it and the controversies surrounding it.299 
Finally, it is worth noting that the normative analysis of privacy 
in the monitoring framework may be flipped for platforms. In most 
historical extensions of monitoring, whether in banking, the 
environment, or health, agencies received extensive monitoring 
authority despite privacy concerns weighing only against monitoring.300 
In contrast, today one of the main goals of any regulatory monitoring 
regime for platforms would presumably be to ensure those companies 
are respecting users’ privacy.301 Thus, even if the regulator collected 
personal information for that purpose, the privacy risks created by the 
regulator would need to be weighed against the privacy benefits of the 
additional regulatory oversight. However, since regulators could audit 
a platform’s privacy systems without collecting personal data, the 
 
 
 
298. Regulators are enforcing mostly civil laws against businesses, meaning that tracing users 
to conduct is largely irrelevant. This is particularly true for transactional and privacy-related 
harms. See supra Section II.A. Speech harms, as mentioned above, provide a weaker case for mon- 
itoring than other categories, but even those harms could be monitored without collecting identi- 
fiable data, as the goal would be to categorize blocked speech, which could be determined by ex- 
amining the platforms’ internal rules alone. If the regulator wanted particular examples, it could 
ask for the user conduct or words that led to ostracizing a given user, without obtaining the user’s 
identity. See supra Section II.A.4. Speech harms and election engineering would, however, come 
closer to implicating criminal wrongs, and thus any program would need to weigh the value of 
identifying wrongdoers and the threats to privacy in the collection of such information. If the com- 
munications were already publicly available on a social media platform, there would be fewer pri- 
vacy concerns. 
299. Infra Section IV.C (summarizing political pressures on regulators regarding personal in- 
formation). 
300. See supra Section I.C.1. 
301. See supra Section II.A.1. 
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privacy  analysis  should  overall  weigh  more  in  favor of  regulatory 
monitoring in the surveillance age than it did in prior eras. 
To be clear, agency officials could potentially misuse regulatory 
information acquired about businesses and individuals—or an 
unscrupulous executive could seek to leverage it to persecute political 
opponents. Those issues are, however, more about design of the 
regulatory monitoring—and indeed about appropriate constraints on 
government power—than about whether to extend the authority in the 
first place.302 Legal and organizational safeguards are crucial for any 
regulatory monitoring program. The main point here is that avoiding 
regulatory monitoring of platforms altogether due to anxiety about 
individual privacy would be inconsistent with a broader perspective on 
regulatory monitoring, privacy, and the administrative state. 
 
C. Regulatory Burden 
 
How should the costs of compliance be weighed in the case of 
platforms? There is little that can be said with certainty about the 
monetary costs of monitoring platforms because no such program exists. 
Three potential sources of burden lie in stifling innovation, increasing 
the costs that the platform incurs in providing information to the 
regulator, and spending public resources collecting and processing the 
information. 
One possibility is that monitoring could chill innovation by 
making the innovator nervous about trying something new, out of fear 
of being punished for the unknown. Or monitoring could deter new 
entrants because of the costs of complying with heavy oversight, 
thereby deterring the entrance of new ideas.303 While it may be true 
that “[w]e couldn’t kill the Internet if we tried,”304 the issue is largely 
theoretical because the interplay between regulation and innovation is 
poorly understood as an empirical matter.305 Also, the potential for 
stifling innovation is a broader point about regulating business in 
general, as a similar concern could be raised about other enforcement 
 
 
 
302. Although I return to the question of designing monitoring programs in Section IV.C, in- 
fra, that topic is sufficiently capacious to require a separate project. 
303. See, e.g., David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 765–70 (2001). 
304. Paul Ohm, We Couldn’t Kill the Internet If We Tried, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 79, 85 
(2016). Another possibility is a chilling effect in which users do not want to provide their data to 
firms out of fear that the government will attain it. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Michal Gal, The 
Chilling Effect of Governance-By-Data on Data Markets, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 407 (2019). 
305. Keith N. Hylton, A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation Policy, 22 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 164 (2014) (discussing how competition policy often omits innovation 
considerations). 
2019] MONITORING IN THE SURVEILLANCE AGE 1615 
 
 
mechanisms, such as ex post litigation. Society has so far rejected 
suppression of innovation as an argument against regulation, given the 
prevalence of regulation in the economy, but the narrative may hold 
greater weight for platforms, given the industry’s entrepreneurial 
ethos.306 
A more tangible cost is the expenditure of resources to transfer 
information.307 Those costs could be substantial and should be factored 
in to any proposed oversight regime. In undertaking such a prospective 
analysis, it would be valuable to leverage the empirical studies of the 
costs of monitoring in other industries. The challenge with doing that, 
however, is that overall compliance costs are driven by the extent of the 
substantive regulation in addition to the costs of monitoring. Since far 
fewer substantive laws govern platforms than, say, banks, platforms 
would presumably have less information to transfer—and thus a lower 
monitoring burden.308 
For the estimates to be comprehensive, they should include the 
potential savings that studies have found from governmental 
monitoring. These savings include benefits to shareholders, who may 
not be able to sufficiently monitor the risks taken by a firm’s managers, 
as well as the avoidance of compliance costs that the firm would have 
otherwise undertaken.309 Counterintuitively, since platforms already 
spend a considerable amount of money on data security, it is possible 
that a centralized regulator providing monitoring services across an 
entire industry could reduce some platform costs by providing 
economies of scale—or add shareholder value by providing more 
reliable monitoring of risks.310 
Platforms might even interface with monitors more efficiently 
than have businesses in other industries. Monitoring is, after all, about 
transferring information. One of platforms’ core specialties is collecting 
and transferring information in a highly automated manner. Thus, 
platforms’ monitoring burden may be significantly less than for 
companies whose core operations are far from information technology. 
 
 
 
306. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 409 (1989) (discussing the expanding role of regulation since the new deal). 
307. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regu- 
latory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 799–800 (2003). 
308. The amount of information that would need to be transferred per law is also relevant to 
this equation. 
309. See, e.g., Emilio Bisetti, The Value of Regulators as Monitors: Evidence from Banking 
(June 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab- 
stract_id=3081537 [https://perma.cc/67Z9-WQ3J] (finding that reduction of Federal Reserve mon- 
itoring of banks increased firms’ internal compliance costs and lowered shareholder value). 
310. The gains to shareholders would need to be weighed against any value destroyed by mon- 
itoring. 
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D. Summary of Factors for Monitoring Online Platforms 
 
Among the four types of public interest discussed—privacy, civic 
engagement, transactional integrity, and speech—the strength of the 
case for monitoring varies. The case for monitoring speech harms, for 
instance, is weaker than for monitoring election engineering.311 
Nonetheless, the main normative historical drivers of monitoring are 
largely present in online platforms: harms worth preventing, 
insufficient public information, and a track record of failed self- 
regulation. 
The factors that might weigh against monitoring platforms are, 
if anything, potentially weaker than in other monitored industries. 
Platforms can transfer information to regulators at a lower cost, since 
data is their core product. While the issue of privacy has certainly 
become more complex in the digital era due to users’ privacy interests, 
at the very least, concerns about users’ privacy should not prevent 
regulators from collecting only business information, rather than 
personal information. For most types of harm, an informative 
monitoring program is possible without a regulator ever collecting 
personal data and instead focusing on information about the platform 
and its processes. 
However, where personal data collection is necessary to protect 
users, there are precedents in other industries for legally and 
organizationally constraining agencies that collect  highly sensitive 
information. Ultimately, citing personal data as a reason against 
regulatory monitoring of platforms would be a red herring. Rather, 
privacy arguably strengthens the case for monitoring platforms since 
large business owners’ privacy interests are minimally affected. 
Moreover, those minimal interests must be balanced against the 
privacy interests of millions of platform users in having regulatory 
oversight of how platforms use their data. 
Legitimate privacy concerns, as well as the need to protect trade 
secrets and minimize regulatory burden, underscore how any 
monitoring regime should be designed—with appropriate 
accountability and burden-minimizing processes in place. Those details 
would need to be worked out in a way that is sensitive to the specific 
platform and harm. The main point here is that if policymakers were to 
weigh the principal factors as they have in oil, pharmaceuticals, food 
 
 
 
 
311. Nonetheless, compared to the alternative of leaving it entirely to platforms, there is still 
a normative and historical case for monitoring content moderation. See supra Kyle Langvardt, 
Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1353 (2018); Section II.A.4. 
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safety, and most other major industries, they would find normative 
foundations for monitoring platforms. 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY MONITORING 
 
The case study of platforms most immediately suggests that 
policymakers should consider building new monitoring programs for 
the increasingly digital economy. It also shows how the information 
collection framework developed in a pre-digital era is in need of 
refinement. Most importantly, in the surveillance age, policymakers 
must balance a more complex set of privacy interests. 
 
A. FTC Monitoring of Platforms 
 
What steps would be necessary for regulatory monitoring of 
platforms? No single agency would have jurisdiction over all of the 
categories of public interest discussed above, but the FTC has authority 
to enforce two of them: privacy and transactional harms.312 Yet the 
agency currently operates on a largely ex post model that has failed in 
the past to assess whether online platforms are taking necessary steps 
to safeguard user data.313 Their antitrust enforcement processes also 
allow platforms to establish themselves during critical periods of 
competition, after which it would likely be impractical to undo the 
harm.314 While legislation and other agencies may be necessary for 
monitoring other types of platform harm such as election engineering 
and speech moderation, this Section examines the FTC’s relatively 
straightforward path to monitoring the surveillance economy. 
Because the FTC has generally not engaged in monitoring 
except in narrow contexts where explicitly required by statute, its legal 
authority to develop a monitoring regime of platforms is in many 
regards unsettled. But under section 6(a) of its originating statute, the 
agency has the power “[t]o gather and compile information concerning, 
and  to  investigate  from  time  to  time  the  organization,  business, 
 
 
312. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805 (2012). On the FTC’s privacy enforcement, see, for example, Chris 
Jay Hoofnagle, FTC Regulation of Cybersecurity and Surveillance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK 
OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 708, 708, 722–23 (David Gray & Stephen Henderson eds., 2017) (observing 
also that “regulation of the private-sector has effects on the government as surveillant”); Daniel J. 
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
583, 585 (2014). 
313. See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text. 
314. Cf. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The Federal Trade Commission’s Inner Privacy Struggle, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 179 (Evan Selinger et al.) (2018) (“The delay in- 
volved in FTC processes gives respondents time to establish their platform and shut out competi- 
tors.”). 
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conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or 
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”315 It also 
has the authority to require regular submission of reports, which it used 
in 1975 to request cost and sales data from 450 of the largest U.S. 
manufacturing firms.316 Cost and sales data is particularly sensitive 
and closely guarded information, which explains why about 180 of the 
companies filed motions to quash.317 In upholding the program, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that the FTC’s statute 
“provides a clear basis of authority for the Commission to issue orders 
requiring corporations to submit informational reports to the FTC.”318 
Subsequent legislative reforms to the FTC’s authority have preserved 
its main monitoring tools.319 
In 1980, Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”), 
which requires Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) approval for 
certain information collection activities.320 But OMB approval is only 
required for information collection from ten or more entities, meaning 
that the FTC could at least collect information from the most important 
nine platforms or through one-off requests.321 Moreover, as an 
independent agency, the FTC has the statutory option of overruling any 
OMB rejection.322 For these and other reasons, the Act is more of a legal 
barrier to the type of industry-wide information collection used in 
rulemaking—but has not generally prevented regulatory monitoring.323 
Indeed, the FTC even recently used 6(b) authority to collect sensitive 
 
 
 
315. FTC Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 6(a), 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) 
(2012)). 
316. Appeal of FTC Line of Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curium). 
317. Id. at 692. 
318. Id. at 693. This observation arose even though no parties questioned the FTC’s authority. 
Id. The court also noted that the FTC’s order was “clearly investigatory in nature.” Id. at 696. 
319. The FTC Improvements Act of 1980 directed the agency to use civil investigative demands 
(“CID”s) instead of subpoenas for investigating unfair and deceptive acts, though not for competi- 
tion. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (2012)). The CID is broader in scope, but the tools are functionally 
the same and separate from the regular report collection function. See A Brief Overview of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Apr. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/ 
WK5A-87J6]. 
320. Pub L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012)). 
321. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c)(4) (2018). 
322. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502(5), 3507(f) (2012). Of course, that move by the FTC may be politically 
untenable. The full extent of independence from review by the Office of Information and Regula- 
tory Affairs (“OIRA”) is debated and evolving. See Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Re- 
sponding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 506–07 (2014). 
323. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (listing independent agencies covered by the Act, such as 
banking regulators, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission); Van Loo, supra note 2, at 408–12 (describing monitoring by same 
agencies). 
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information from large companies for a one-off study, after satisfying 
the PRA requirements.324 
Consider, also, how FTC monitoring might be viewed in the 
context of the surveillance state. The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) has surveilled individuals extensively despite 
an originating statute granting only the ability to “investigate” 
suspects.325 The FBI has conducted far-reaching personal surveillance 
with an enabling statute that mentions only the authority to “detect” 
crimes.326 The FTC’s explicit authorizations to “gather and compile” and 
“investigate from time to time” more clearly indicate monitoring 
authority than do the originating statutes of the DEA and FBI. Viewed 
against the backdrop of expansive DEA and FBI surveillance under 
vaguer originating authorities, the FTC’s ability to build a monitoring 
program is even stronger—particularly since it would be collecting 
information from businesses, rather than individuals.327 
Supreme Court decisions provide further support for FTC 
monitoring authority. The Court has concluded that the FTC’s organic 
statute provides “ample power” to require reports, as well as to send 
investigators to examine a company’s books.328 More broadly, 
regulatory requests for business records do not require a warrant, or 
even allegations of a particular violation, as long as the requests are not 
unreasonable and relate to “general or statistical investigations.”329 
Thus, the FTC’s enabling statute and direct case history, along with 
courts’ treatment of other regulators and crime agencies, indicate that 
the commissioners can construct a vigorous platform-monitoring 
program if they so choose. 
Monitoring requires personnel, so the FTC would need to either 
obtain  new  allocations  or  reassign  existing  employees.  Limited 
 
 
 
324. FED.   TRADE    COMM’N,    PATENT    ASSERTION    ENTITY    ACTIVITY     37–38    (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc- 
study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7S3- 
8LZT] (compelling companies, after meeting PRA requirements and using 6(b) authority, to pro- 
vide nonpublic information to study patent competition). 
325. See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified at 
5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2012)). 
326. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 531, 533 (2012). The FBI has not sought to justify its surveillance under 
this detection clause and has instead looked to the unconvincing residual authority of the All Writs 
Act—which is also available to the FTC. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012)); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediar- 
ies, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 126 (2018) (noting frequent use by FBI). 
327. See supra Section III.B.2. 
328. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 649 (1950). 
329. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1946); see also McLane Co. v. 
EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159 (2017) (noting that the EEOC should be given access to any material that 
might be relevant to the investigation). 
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resources undermine detection.330 Nonetheless, the agency’s current 
workforce could support a meaningful level of monitoring. The CFPB 
runs a substantial monitoring apparatus with over 400 examiners, 
compared to about 350 attorneys.331 The FTC has an insignificant 
number of monitors and over 700 attorneys.332 Platforms would require 
fewer monitors than financial institutions, because the latter are some 
of the most heavily regulated businesses, requiring the CFPB to 
monitor over one hundred large banks, thousands of payday lenders, 
and many other categories of financial institutions for compliance with 
dense laws.333 Devoting even one hundred FTC employees to monitoring 
would allow meaningful examinations, especially if focused on the ten 
largest platforms.334 At the very least, the FTC’s leaders should actively 
decide whether it is worth diverting resources from their other activities 
to monitoring platforms, rather than assume no other option exists. The 
FTC’s recent move to create a twenty-person task force to “monitor” 
platforms for antitrust violations demonstrates the plausibility of such 
resource reallocations.335 However, for the FTC to develop a monitoring 
program more in line with that of most other large regulators, the 
agency would need to devote more resources; expand its monitoring to 
cover other areas of its mission, such as privacy and consumer 
protection more broadly; and make it a routine practice to compel 
businesses to produce information rather than doing so only in a more 
ex post manner once a particular issue has clearly become a problem. 
What the FTC would do with such information is not the subject 
of this Article. Still, despite more limited civil penalty and rulemaking 
authority than some other agencies,336 the FTC has wide-ranging 
consumer protection and antitrust authority designed to evolve with 
markets.337 It would be able to take significant action to address some 
of the privacy and transactional harms discussed above. 
 
 
 
330. See, e.g., Hoofnagle, supra note 314, at 170. 
331. Van Loo, supra note 2, at App. A. 
332. Id. 
333. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 232, 237, 271–75 (2018) (summarizing the CFPB’s authority). 
334. Moving employees to monitoring would require a cost-benefit analysis of the relative im- 
portance of those employees’ other tasks. Given the prominence of platforms in the modern econ- 
omy, the harms presented by platforms should compare well. 
335. See sources cited supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
336. During a deregulatory period of the 1980s, Congress curtailed the agency’s ability to im- 
pose civil penalties and write rules, making the FTC in this regard weaker than, say, the CFPB. 
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (2012)). 
337. Its mandate to regulate unfair and deceptive acts is purposefully broad, designed to 
change on an “evolutionary basis” alongside markets. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 
982 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Additionally, the prospect of a federal regulator bringing public lawsuits, 
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However, a monitoring program need not involve aggressive 
prosecutions. Ex post legal investigations typically result in a formal 
enforcement action after major wrongdoing has occurred. In contrast, 
monitoring fits well with the modern emphasis on collaborative 
governance—that is, working with firms to solve problems rather than 
adopting a punitive approach at the first signs of wrongdoing.338 By 
identifying issues early on before they have become systemic, the FTC 
would be better situated to steer firms away from problematic practices 
before major liabilities materialize. 
Nor does a monitoring regime need to involve extensive 
information collection. As explained above, the FTC could still learn a 
great deal without analyzing source code or collecting large troves of 
detailed information. The FTC could, for example, examine whether 
companies have appropriate privacy practices by requesting existing 
internal summary reports and explanations from employees.339 After 
the FTC initially learned more about how a given platform operated, 
and as substantive platform regulations developed, it would have a 
better sense of what types of questions to ask to identify ways that the 
platform could avoid causing harm. 
In some instances, existing internal reports and insights would 
not exist, in which case the FTC or Congress would need to take 
additional steps, such as imposing “audit trails” on platforms to ensure 
they record the reasoning and facts related to their decisions.340 Other 
tools, such as ordering companies to conduct technical systems tests, 
may be needed.341 Private third-party monitors could also complement 
FTC monitoring—although the FTC has less ability to impose private 
monitoring industry wide than it does to exercise its own authority to 
collect information.342 Finally, it would be valuable to determine what 
types of information are necessary to achieve particular goals and the 
 
 
 
even if those actions would have limited monetary impact, would hold some sway in motivating a 
large platform to comply with requests. 
338. See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 397–98. 
339. See supra Section II.C. 
340. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1305 
(2008) (discussing audit trails for government entities’ automated decisions); Crawford & Schultz, 
supra note 12, at 121–24 (applying Citron’s proposal to the private sector). 
341. See Hoofnagle, supra note 191, at 7. 
342. The FTC currently deploys third-party private monitoring through settlement agree- 
ments and for limited periods of time, which is different from the kind of ongoing monitoring dis- 
cussed here. See supra Section II.C. There may be efficiency advantages to some forms of private 
monitoring. Cf. Emily S. Bremer, Private Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L. REV. 1115, 
1117 (2016) (discussing the institutional tradeoffs between private and public governance). An- 
other issue is whether the FTC’s ability to collect information from time to time covers on-site 
examinations of platforms. Assuming that it does not, a remote monitoring program would also 
help the agency determine whether to request such authority. 
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extent to which personal, rather than purely business, information is 
needed to determine compliance with a given law.343 These and many 
other platform governance features have been explored elsewhere.344 
The necessity of working out further details about the shape and 
scope of FTC monitoring, and political pressures weighing against FTC 
assertiveness,345 should not obscure a more fundamental point. There 
is a strong basis for concluding that the FTC already has the mandate, 
without new legislation, to build a substantial monitoring program. 
Used as a complement to other tools, such as ex post litigation and 
consumer complaints, monitoring could contribute to a more robust 
oversight architecture for the most surprisingly unregulated entities in 
the information age. 
 
B. The FCC, EEOC, and State Regulators 
 
Most of this Article has focused on online platforms, a regulatory 
sphere most relevant to the FTC. But a variety of other companies can 
leverage technologies to engage in “digital market manipulation.”346 
The monitoring framework, and its emerging tension with surveillance, 
thus implicates other regulators. 
First, the FCC has extensive unused monitoring authority over 
cable and telecommunications firms.347 Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, and 
similar companies arguably have greater ability to surveil than does 
Facebook, because they can access all transferred data.348 Cable and 
telecommunication companies can also sell that data to third parties, 
thus cashing in on the incredible revenues from “big data, the new 
oil.”349 A policy norm that prioritizes individuals’ privacy over that of 
 
 
 
 
343. See discussion supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
344. See sources cited supra note 12; see also Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the 
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346. Calo, supra note 198, at 999; see also Shaun B. Spencer, The Problem of Online Manipu- 
lation, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab- 
stract_id=3341653&download=yes     [https://perma.cc/N438-YAJU]. 
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browsing data that flows through them. S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted). 
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businesses would lend support to the FCC monitoring how these firms 
handle such massive data access. 
Additionally, the EEOC provides an example of an agency 
operating beyond the technology sector. Its originating statute, the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, granted the authority to systematically collect 
salary data from employers about pay to identify racial, gender, or other 
discriminatory pay practices.350 But the EEOC did not write rules to 
collect such data systematically until 2012.351 Moreover, although the 
agency now collects considerable data in a routine manner from large 
companies nationwide, it devotes only a handful of employees to 
analyzing such data, relying primarily on employee complaints to open 
over ninety-nine percent of investigations.352 Granted, analyzing 
systematic employment data raises difficult questions about causality 
and poses the risk of false accusations.353 But given that the agency now 
collects large amounts of data, many of the costs to privacy and 
compliance have already been overcome. In light of the difficulty one 
employee may have in ascertaining pay differences, discriminatory pay 
seems to be an area in need of rigorous cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether it merits greater use of regulatory monitoring. 
Finally, state and local regulators also undertake considerable 
monitoring. City inspectors grade restaurants, and county authorities 
oversee cable companies.354 State and local regulatory monitors have 
limits because multinational companies’ wrongdoing, particularly when 
data is involved, typically transcends local government borders. Also, 
courts consistently allow federal crime agencies to access state 
regulatory information.355 Still, in some instances it may make sense 
for local regulatory authorities to monitor business activities, especially 
in the absence of action by federal regulators. Indeed, it was a local 
agency that initiated action in some of the biggest corporate 
prosecutions in recent years, such as the Los Angeles city lawsuit 
against Wells Fargo for creating fake accounts in customers’ names.356 
 
 
 
350. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709, 78 Stat. 241, 262–64. 
351. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2018). 
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354. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 13, at 607–08. 
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And though the FTC has not audited Airbnb for racial discrimination 
by hosts, the state of California Department of Fair Employment and 
Housing has used its legal authority to conduct tests.357 
It is difficult to know, from the outside, why any particular 
agency leader may have opted not to monitor—or whether that 
possibility was even considered. But regulators’ historical track record 
gives little confidence that repeated decisions to refrain from 
monitoring were made on the merits, and instead indicates that those 
decisions may be explained by industry capture or institutional 
inertia.358 Ideally, legislators and agency leaders would take a fresh 
look at whether they should exercise regulatory monitoring—their 
primary means for understanding businesses—wherever that tool 
currently lies dormant. 
 
C. Moving Monitoring Out of the Shadow of Surveillance 
 
Whether the goal is to build a new technology meta-agency that 
monitors platforms, to require Facebook and Twitter to submit real- 
time election advertising reports to the Federal Election Commission, 
or for the FTC commissioners to use the authority they already have, 
policymakers must undertake a normative and legal analysis about the 
appropriate exercise of administrative information collection. That 
inquiry is more difficult because regulatory monitoring is, as a matter 
of law and popular imagination, part of the surveillance state. 
In a world in which “everything has software,”359 large portions 
of the regulatory state that collect information from businesses could 
now be incorrectly seen as engaging in personal surveillance. Part of 
the problem is the pervasive monolithic portrayal of government 
information collection. Scholars and judges often describe both business 
regulators and crime agencies as being engaged in surveillance.360 The 
challenge with a close association between the two is that observers, 
including Supreme Court Justices, frequently reference an Orwellian 
1984 dystopia in their discussions of crime data surveillance.361 Indeed, 
 
 
 
357. Voluntary Agreement at 16–17, Dep’t of Fair Emp. and Hous. of Calif. v. Airbnb, Inc., 
Nos. 574743-231889, 574743-231624, (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/up- 
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concerns about a totalitarian state pervade broader advocacy for 
privacy.362 Nor is the association with totalitarianism limited to crime 
agencies—television commercials, op-eds, and social media depict 
regulators such as the FTC, CFPB, and EEOC as “Big Brother.”363 
These pervasive references to a single state scrutinizing our 
lives likely carry weight with the public. Apple CEO Tim Cook even 
appealed to such suspicions when the FBI attempted to gain access to 
terrorism suspects’ phones following the shooting deaths of fourteen 
people at a San Bernardino, California work party in 2016.364 In an open 
letter, Cook warned that the FBI’s demands would “undermine the very 
freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.”365 Cook went 
on to state the implications of granting the FBI’s request: 
The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand that Apple build 
surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial 
data, track your location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your 
knowledge.366 
Note that Cook’s message uses the singular term, “the government,” but 
mentions health records and financial data—information collected by 
business regulators—alongside video and sound recordings of personal 
space, which are more relevant to crime agencies.367 
It is also noteworthy that terrorist attacks are one of the 
strongest justifications for surveillance.368 The CEO of a major 
consumer company would appeal to consumers’ anxiety about privacy 
to ward off a government agency obtaining information about terrorist 
activities only if he—based, presumably, on the considerable research 
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368. Cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 729–30, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“After the September 11th attacks, Congress expanded the Government’s authority to ob- 
tain additional records.”). 
1626 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1563 
 
 
insights available to him about customers—believed that such rhetoric 
persuades a substantial portion of the public. Indeed, despite those 
salient government interests in obtaining access to suspected terrorists’ 
phones, about forty-five percent of people supported Apple’s refusal to 
help the FBI.369 
It is difficult to know the impact of these blurred lines on 
regulatory monitoring policy. But the muddling of the concept of state 
surveillance may enable political actors with a deregulatory agenda to 
leverage privacy concerns on a broader basis. For instance, when Mick 
Mulvaney became the interim director of the CFPB in 2017, one of his 
first moves was to freeze a significant amount of information collection 
out of concerns that the CFPB could endanger consumers’ privacy.370 
The effect of the data collection freeze was to significantly hinder the 
agency’s core regulatory activities.371 
To be clear, Mulvaney may have been responding to the 
legitimate privacy concerns that exist whenever an agency collects 
personal information, and did reinstate some information collection 
processes after the Inspector General found that the CFPB had not 
endangered consumers’ privacy.372 But Mulvaney was a strong 
opponent of the CFPB. He had previously called the agency a “sick, sad” 
joke, had introduced legislation to terminate the CFPB in his previous 
role as a congressman, and, even after being appointed interim director, 
continued to reiterate that the agency should not exist.373 Regardless of 
Mulvaney’s motives in freezing data collection, the incident highlights 
the potential tension between regulation and privacy. 
Additional signs suggest regulators are wary that monitoring 
will make them vulnerable to being publicly associated with 
surveillance. For instance, in 2009 the FTC called for online endorsers 
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of products to disclose any gifts or payments they received.374 Following 
online commentaries comparing the agency to Big Brother, an FTC 
official issued a statement saying, “We are not going to be patrolling the 
blogosphere.”375 Given that public perception has historically played an 
important role in driving Congress to authorize monitoring,376 a core 
enforcement activity could face additional obstacles in the surveillance 
era. 
Greater clarity in discussing and analyzing regulatory 
monitoring is thus important for regulating businesses in the 
surveillance era. This Article has highlighted, at a top level, two main 
sources of confusion. The first is the question about which agency is 
acting, with the most important challenge being the conflation of crime 
and regulatory agencies. The second is the type of information sought, 
especially whether it is business or personal.377 These distinctions 
complement existing efforts to move toward more accountable and 
transparent algorithms.378 
A few further preliminary observations on this basic taxonomy 
and its application are in order. One of its main functions is to facilitate 
a more refined normative analysis. Each type of information collection 
would still be weighed in terms of the traditional normative factors, 
such as information asymmetries.379 Within that analysis, however, the 
regular collection of business information, without any personal data, 
would face a lower privacy barrier than would the other categories. 
It bears emphasis that neither a taxonomy nor a normative 
framework for exercising information collection should hew too closely 
to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. To be sure, a real-world state 
privacy hierarchy would ideally reflect the constitutional prioritization 
of personal over business privacy.380 But the Fourth Amendment allows 
agencies to subpoena even sensitive personal records, such as bank 
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account statements, held by businesses—and confusingly calls them 
“business records.”381 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence thus has little 
to offer from a prescriptive standpoint or in terms of linguistic precision. 
What would it mean to write laws with this privacy hierarchy in 
mind? A prominent legislative example of a failure to differentiate 
regulatory monitoring from crime surveillance comes from what has 
been called the constitution of the administrative state: the APA. 
Section 555(c) of the APA specifies that any “requirement of a report, 
inspection, or other investigative act or demand may not be issued, 
made, or enforced except as authorized by law.”382 Drafters intended the 
APA to govern both crime agencies and regulators,383 and the official 
legislative notes on section 555 show that they wanted to address 
personal privacy.384 Given that personal privacy is violated mostly by 
crime agencies associated with the Fourth Amendment and government 
overreach,385 lawmakers drafting a statute covering all agencies would 
understandably err on the side of constraints. 
Despite being drafted with a goal of constraining crime agencies’ 
information collection, the APA is rarely applied to crime agencies.386 
Thus, through the APA lawmakers imposed an additional hurdle for 
regulatory monitoring that did not exist for crime agencies. Although in 
court the APA has not posed a significant obstacle to the FTC and other 
regulators’ exercise of monitoring,387 agencies decide on courses of 
action to minimize the chance of being judicially overturned.388  By 
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failing to differentiate the information collection nuances of the 
administrative state, lawmakers may have, through the APA, 
inadvertently had a chilling effect on business regulators regarding 
information collection. 
The information default in administrative statutes such as the 
APA would ideally reflect the different privacy implications and 
historical tendencies of the specific type of agency. The APA might, for 
instance, be amended to change its default rule to allow a regulator to 
collect information from businesses necessary to carry out its mission. 
Congress could then limit that default for any given agency or in 
particular contexts, such as through the Paperwork Reduction Act.389 
Indeed, the APA may be best interpreted as allowing broad regulatory 
monitoring as long as an agency’s organic statute mentions basic 
information collection authority—since that is how crime agencies’ 
authority has been interpreted.390 
In designing monitoring statutes, there would be further value 
in adjusting for the type of information collected. Lawmakers and 
judges might, for instance, give less weight to the business owners’ 
interests in withholding anonymized personal data from regulators if 
that business is already routinely sharing similar nonanonymized data 
with crime agencies. Crime agencies would, in a sense, provide a floor 
for what business regulators could collect. More important than any 
particular reform, a reoriented normative framework for monitoring 
should more explicitly fit each type of information collection, rather 
than subsuming regulatory monitoring into the constraint-oriented 
crime surveillance framework. 
None of this speaks to valid concerns about business regulators 
taking adequate precautions with any data collected, including passing 
information on to crime agencies391 Information-sharing concerns are 
relevant to the question of deciding whether to support a monitoring 
proposal because policymakers, scholars, and the public must have 
confidence in advance that appropriate safeguards are possible. In 
addition to the existing constraints discussed above, one layer of 
additional protection would be statutorily prohibiting the regulator 
from collecting personal data, such as accessing the contents of Gmail 
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messages, except where necessary for the nature of the law.392 Instead, 
the regulator may be allowed to collect information about Google’s 
policies, such as how its algorithms analyze, store, and share those 
emails, and perhaps the anonymized consumer complaints that Google 
has received.393 
Another layer of protection for individuals’ privacy would come 
from mandating firewalls for sharing information both within the 
agency and externally. Banking regulators provide one such model, in 
which examiners closely safeguard the raw data they collect.394 The 
Office of the Inspector General could then ensure that regulators are 
following mandated data security precautions, as it did with the 
CFPB.395 Although business regulators are already hesitant to collect 
sensitive information and reluctant to share it, these limits built into 
legislation would limit risks further.396 
Once it is recognized that regulators can collect valuable 
information from businesses without undermining privacy, the issue of 
monitoring platforms can be analyzed more rigorously. Empirical work 
on the cost-benefit analysis of monitoring, including a comparison to ex 
post fines, would advance that project considerably. A crucial initial 
step is to weigh the tradeoffs on their merits, rather than dismiss 
monitoring out of a fear that collecting data from Amazon, Google, 
Facebook, or other businesses is a step on the path to totalitarianism. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the linkage between regulatory monitoring and 
personal surveillance is inevitable, these two administrative 
mechanisms need greater distinction and coherence. If information is 
the lifeblood of good governance, an increasingly muddled monitoring 
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framework constricts a key artery of the administrative state. Privacy, 
as it is currently understood and advocated, offers a pretext for 
deregulation. 
Nowhere is state information incoherence starker than in the 
nonmonitoring of the platform economy. The very firms that have 
enabled the state to circumvent restrictive surveillance laws are 
themselves unusually shielded from observation, even as many other 
industries are required to provide troves of data for regulatory 
examination. As a result, key regulators, most notably the FTC, do not 
have the information needed to analyze arguably the most important 
firms in the modern economy—the gatekeepers of information in the 
information age. Paradoxically, more ongoing private information 
collection by the government—in other words, activity that could easily 
be confused with surveillance and often is—might in fact be necessary 
to contain harmful surveillance of individuals. 
Faced with an increasingly opaque and continually changing 
business landscape, some of the most important administrative 
agencies in the information age are sitting on dormant “power to get 
information from those who best can give it and who are most interested 
in not doing so.”397 Regulators would be better situated to exercise that 
authority with monitoring moved out of the shadow of surveillance. 
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